CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

STRATEGIC STABILITY AND MUTUAL SECURITY IN THE YEAR 2000: GETTING THERE FROM HERE

Proceedings of a Meeting
Erice, Italy
25-27 April 1986

INSTITUT CANADIEN POUR LA PAIX ET
LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES

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NOTE: This abridged transcript of the discussion is intended to provide a balanced and accurate reflection of the main lines of the Erice meeting. For reasons of space, however, it has been necessary to omit all but the highlights of the discussion; some of the statements have accordingly been greatly abridged and others not central to the main themes of the conference have been omitted entirely. It should be noted also that the discussion was based on a set of papers submitted to the meeting by a number of the participants. These papers have been published in full in the Summer 1986 issue of the United Nations periodical, Disarmament (Vol. IX, No. 2). Where they were introduced or read by their authors without extensive departures from the printed text, these papers have been very briefly summarized here.

Speakers are identified in the order in which they spoke, and a full list of the participants in the meeting will be found following the main text. United Nations Under-Secretary General Jan Martenson acted as chairman of the meeting; Geoffrey Pearson, Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, served as moderator for the first day, Manfred Mueller of the Institute of International Relations of the German Democratic Republic for the second day and Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the Conference on Disarmament, for the third day.

United Nations Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jan Martenson opened the meeting with a statement welcoming the participants and outlining the nature and purposes of the conference. The full text of his statement has been published in Disarmament (Vol. IX, No.2)

FABIO MIGLIORINI, Minister Plenipotentiary, Disarmament Department,
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Since I am at the same time the representative of the host Government and a guest, allow me both to welcome all of you to Italy and to thank the "Ettore Majorana" Centre for its generosity in making this meeting possible here.

The issue of strategic stability and security is indeed the crucial issue of our time and of the years leading to the end of the second millenium. It is strictly connected with the prospects of peace in the world and therefore deserves all our attention. Strategic stability is at the same time a concept, a perception and a situation, all of them constantly evolving. It is a very complex task to ascertain the underlying data and devise ways to strengthen it. One of the factors, of course, is technological development. Another factor is the perception of security on the part of countries and groups of countries, and their willingness to accept a degree of security that does not diminish beyond acceptability the degree of security of other countries. Through negotiations it is certainly possible to try and establish a stronger foundation for peace and security at a lower level of armaments. That is why we are all looking with great hope at the negotiations going on on many disarmament issues in various fora, and first of all, in the context of bilateral negotiations in Geneva. Disarmament can increase security and the perception of security in turn can increase the chances of disarmament. Disarmament by itself, however, would not increase stability. It has to be balanced disarmament. It has to be complemented by verification to improve reliance on agreed measures and to strengthen mutual trust. Mutual trust is another fundamental element of security and peace, and it too can be gradually strengthened through contacts among Governments, negotiations, general restraint in difficult situations and the transparency of intentions. Verification and transparency are really the basis of mutual trust.

At the end of the second millenium mankind is facing an immense problem, that of giving up one of the most often used means of resolving disputes, that is, through resort to weapons. Technological advancement in the production of weapons in fact -- and not only of nuclear weapons -- has reached such a stage that in a few decades mankind will have to decide between renouncing forever the use of force or proceeding toward self-destruction. I suppose that renouncing the use of force is something, or has become something, which is almost contrary to the nature of man, but it must be done, and it must be done in the context of stability and security for all, in a world that should provide for competition in many areas, without war. This means that competition itself, however, will have to be limited and regulated, that fanaticism should give way to tolerance and that excessive ambitions of many kinds will have to disappear.

THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION

GEOFFREY PEARSON (Moderator), Director, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

I want just to remind you that the purpose of our meeting is to explore ways of establishing a basis for agreement on types of defense postures coupled with arms limitation and mutual security arrangements which would provide the foundation for a stable peace in the year 2000. There are three ideas there -- defense postures, arms limitation and mutual security. It was suggested in the programme that the first day of discussion would focus on strategic stability, with particular reference to technological and military factors, and the second on more general political aspects of mutual security. So presumably today we should try to restrict ourselves as best as we can to defense postures and technological factors. But I think it will be difficult for us to divide everything into clearly technical or military factors and reserve politics for tomorrow.

I don't think the world works that way. So I'm not going to stop people from speaking about political matters as one aspect of military and defense questions. But I would hope that we at least try to concentrate today on the military and technological factors that influence security, and reserve tomorrow mainly for the political aspects.

G.O.1 OLUSANYA, Director General, Institute of International Affairs, Lagos

Professor Olusanya read a paper entitled "Perspectives on Strategic Stability and Mutual Security toward the Year 2000" which dealt inter alia with the effects of the East-West competition on other parts of the world, including Africa, and called for a redefinition of global security which would give adequate attention to its socio-economic dimension. The full text of the paper has been published in Disarmament, Summer 1986 (Vol. IX, No. 2).

JAN PRAWITZ, Special Assistant for Disarmament, Ministry of Defense, Stockholm

Dr. Prawitz introduced his paper, entitled "Small Countries' Security in the Year 2000", which drew attention to a number of technological developments in weapons which, if left unchecked, might threaten stability in the 21st century, and pointed to a number of regional and other arms limitation measures which would help enhance the security of all countries, and of small countries in particular. The full text of his paper has been printed in Disarmament (Vol. IX, No.2)

GEORGE W. RATHJENS, Professor, Defense and Arms Control Program, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass.

I will try to summarize what I have said in my paper. I should first remark that I speak necessarily from an American perspective, but it is certainly not the American perspective, and I would not pretend that at all. I have always been something of a dissenter. But now it is even harder than ever before to speak of an American position on these matters. Half a dozen years ago it would have been possible, I believe, for me to simply summarize American views on nuclear arms control matters and then indicate a few points of dissent on my part. The situation has changed. From 1960 until about 1980 it did seem to me that the official position on these matters was pretty well established. It can be summarized roughly as follows. We accepted the idea that nuclear deterrence was a reality; that it had to be a key element in American defence policy; that it was impossible to defend ourselves effectively against a determined adversary, particularly the Soviet Union, should it choose to use nuclear weapons; and we accepted the idea, and were optimistic about the possibility, of controlling arms and reducing the likelihood of nuclear war through negotiations. I think that characterized the American view from roughly the end of the Eisenhower Administration through the Carter Administration. With the election of President Reagan everything changed, and we now have, I think, almost total disarray in the United States, including substantial disarray within the Administration on its views with regard to these matters. So it's very hard to talk about a consensus.

Let me take a few minutes, however, to describe what I think is emerging as the main stream in American thinking on these matters, and then I will indicate where I would dissent. The most shocking and the most provocative thing that has happened during the Reagan years has been the statement that the President made in 1983 suggesting that we get away from the idea of nuclear deterrence and replace it with defence, his Strategic Defense Initiative, often referred to as "Star Wars". He really did propose a revolutionary change in American defence policy, certainly the most revolutionary change in the post-war years. There is a rapid erosion of belief in that in the United States. One finds almost nobody defending the President's position any more. All of the people who are working on the Strategic Defense Initiative these days, and even, to some extent, the President himself, now talk about enhancing deterrence rather than replacing it, though apparently he still believes in replacing deterrence with defence. What we have is a situation of considerable ambiguity, but with the technology pointing in the direction, if anything, of defending our military assets rather than trying to provide a perfect defence of all of our population. I assume that that's going to be the direction in which the trend will move particularly after the Reagan Administration. If we try to do anything with defence -- call it Star War, SDI, or whatever -- it will be going back to the views that prevailed prior to the President's speech, that is, a view that we have to continue to live with deterrence and maybe we should, maybe we should not try to make our nuclear weapons and other military assets less vulnerable through defence. I suspect we're going to be moving in that direction.

The other main element in the breakdown of consensus has not, however, been related to defence questions but rather to disillusionment with arms control and revulsion at the idea of deterrence. I think that is going to last. There has been a broad disillusionment with arms control in the United States. We have seen, I think, essentially very little success. The present Administration has contributed to that by condemning the SALT agreements and by not being willing to enter into any arms control agreements. As for reliance on deterrence, that has come under considerable criticism as well, notably by the American Catholic community, but also, again, supported by the President in his Star Wars speech of three years ago, in which he essentially condemned deterrence as a keystone of national policy.

Let me turn a little bit to developments in technology, and where they might take us, and then in my closing remarks I'll indicate some further dissent on my part with the whole view. We are seeing changes in technology, and will see more, that will conceivably have some effect on traditional views about stability. It is, I suppose, just conceivable that the President's view of a strategic defence will prevail, and that we will try to deploy a system that will be close to 100 percent effective. I discount that totally, but still there are some people who subscribe to it, at least Mr. Reagan appears to subscribe to it, and occasionally one has the impression that the Secretary of Defense also subscribes to that view.

Should we move in that direction, there is a widespread view that that would be terribly destabilizing. Many of my friends in the arms control community, many of my friends in the world of science, argue that an attempt to deploy highly effective defences would be terribly destabilizing. The arguments are straightforward. If you are going to have highly effective defences they would necessarily be space-based in some respect, and the elements that are based in space would almost necessarily be terribly vulnerable. In a crisis situation, therefore, there ought logically to be a great impetus for the United States to attempt to destroy any Soviet space-based assets and for the Soviet Union to destroy ours, and this would result in a situation of considerable instability. As I say, I discount that totally, because I don't believe we're ever going to deploy such defences, but I add it as a note here because it is an important part of the current debate.

Other developments in technology I think will be more significant. Notably, we are seeing the attainment of ever-improving accuracies in the delivery of ordnance, nuclear or conventional, and with that, it seems to me, we are certainly going to see an erosion in the so-called firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. We see it in planning in NATO and also in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, where increasingly the possibility arises that conventional ordnance can be delivered with sufficient precision to destroy a very wide variety of targets with very high confidence, including nuclear systems. If that happens, and we get into a serious conflict situation, the impetus to destroy the nuclear capabilities of an adversary's forces without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons oneself will be large. I think we see this most dramatically in naval forces.

We saw it in the case of the recent war in the South Atlantic, where the Exocet missile proved so effective in destroying a British ship. To fire one missile means to destroy one ship. And that trend has to continue. And, unfortunately, we are going to see an increased impetus to put nuclear weapons on all ships, especially with the sea-launched cruise missile coming into the inventories, at least of the United States. This means that we are going to have a situation in which there are a great many ambiguous targets, which can be destroyed with nuclear or conventional weapons -- those ambiguous targets being ships that can deliver either conventional or nuclear ordnance. The same thing will happen on land. I simply focus on the case at sea because it is more dramatic. That is going to make escalation of conflict more likely. I think the improvement in accuracy of weapons, the improvements in data processing, really render surface navies fundamentally obsolete in many ways, and many other kinds of surface targets will become equally vulnerable. They will, however, be retained because in less than major conflict those forces can be very useful.

Here I want to digress from my paper for a moment to talk a little bit about the lessons to be drawn from the recent conflict in Libya. Some very unfortunate conclusions will be drawn in the United States from that experience, and I wish only to highlight them for speculation. I don't approve of the way that situation was dealt with, and I do not particularly want to defend navies. But the lesson will be clear, I think, in the American defense establishment, that if you want to deal with conflict in areas that are remote from US bases, as was Libya, the navy has a specially important role to play. We saw that we could not use American bombers from the United Kingdom without getting permission from the British, we could not overfly Western Europe because the Western European powers would not allow it. The F-111s that were used had great difficulty as a result, and the navy operation went very much better. The lesson is going to be clear to people in the American defense establishment: continue to focus on the maintenance of carrier task forces and other surface ships, which are, from my point of view, very troublesome from the point of view of escalation in a situation of conflict. Here are ships with enormous nuclear capabilities which will be increasingly susceptible to destruction with conventional weapons.

So, in summary, if one looks at these issues from the mainstream point of view, we are going to see an increase in the risk of nuclear war arising out of conventional conflict, mainly because of the particular kinds of weapons that are being developed -- high-precision weapons, better means of intelligence and data processing -- and the continued possession of targets that are attractive from the point of view of an adversary concerned about those targets being used to deliver nuclear weapons against him. This is a very troublesome trend.

Now, let me turn away from those remarks to the main points in the paper I submitted. In that paper, I raised questions about all the elements in orthodox thinking about our problem -- that problem being nuclear weapons and a continuing confrontational relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. We have to continue to accept deterrence as a reality. We don't have to continue to accept it as a preferred element in our security policy. Nuclear weapons are not going to go away. As long as we have them, or even the possibility of building them, they have to play a role in international affairs. But we ought not, in my view, to rely on deterrence as a means of preventing war. Too many things can go wrong, and I, in particular, am increasingly concerned that, if a major war is to develop, it will not be as a result of carefully calculated decisions by people in either Washington or Moscow. If we are going to get into a situation that will involve large-scale expenditures of nuclear weapons by the superpowers it is likely to have its origins in decisions taken elsewhere, decisions taken by people who may not be much influenced by what either the United States or the Soviet Union does. And if that's true, to believe that we can continue to prevent catastrophe by focusing our attention on the weapons that the superpowers have, or trying to deter decisions by people in the Kremlin or the White House, is likely to be misleading. If war is to come because of events in the Middle East or in Eastern Europe, or on the periphery of Eurasia somewhere - Libya, Vietnam, who knows? - then focusing on the strategic weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union as a means of influencing events may not be very productive.

That raises grave doubts in my mind about our emphasis in arms control. The first priority has been in dealing with the intercontinental systems of the two powers, the ICBMs and the submarine-launched missiles, and the next priority has been given to other nuclear delivery systems. I question whether that is reasonable. If the greatest opportunity for reducing the likelihood of a catastrophe lies in reducing the likelihood of a war in, say, the Middle East, then we ought to be less concerned about SS-18s and MX missiles, and more concerned about what goes on in Lebanon, and that ought to be higher in our list of priority concerns.

So I have doubts about deterrence as a basis for policy and I have doubts about arms control, at least as we have known it, as a means for reducing the likelihood of conflict towards the end of the century. I've already indicated that I have doubts about defence as an alternative. President Reagan has proposed a perfect defence as another way of dealing with the problem. I think that's totally unrealistic, indeed, I think it's a cruel hoax. I've compared it in other contexts with offering Laetrile as a cure for cancer when we know it won't work. The search for a perfect defence is like trying to find eternal life through looking for a fountain of youth. It won't work. There are no technical means. If you want to find eternal life you do it through prayer. If you want a perfect defence you'd better turn to prayer too. Don't turn to technology, it's not there and it won't be there, notwithstanding the President's remarks. So I condemn that approach totally, as being totally unrealistic as a means of dealing with the nuclear problem.

I'm also critical of disarmament in my paper. It's harder to be critical of disarmament than it is arms control, because we've tried arms control. We've never tried disarmament. We know arms control doesn't do very much good; it has not affected very much, I think, what either the Soviet Union or the United States has done in the way of weapons acquisition and development. Maybe disarmament will be more successful. I'm not optimistic about it; I don't think 10, 20, 30 or 50 percent reductions will get us very far, even if it's possible to negotiate them, because the level of arms is so high. But I do believe that there is some hope in disarmament. If we could reduce arms by a factor of a hundred, say, or thereabouts -- 99 per cent reductions -- we would then begin to get into a regime where the amount of damage that would occur in the event of war would be less. Now there might be an increase in the likelihood of conflicts should we reduce the levels by 99 percent, and in thinking about the problem one wants to weigh on the one hand the possibility of reducing damage should war occur against some increase in the likelihood that it would occur. But at least there is a conceptual possibility that reductions on that scale would make a difference. There is a talk of going beyond that, with nuclear weapons in particular. General Secretary Gorbachev has proposed their total elimination by the year 2000. I think that's totally unrealistic, and almost as illusory as President Reagan's proposal of 100 percent effective defence. We're not going to achieve 100 percent reduction of nuclear arms by the year 2000 unless there is a major change in the political relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States and all the other countries in the world. There are a variety of reasons, and I go into them in my paper, why complete reductions are, in my view, an illusion.

Let me sum up. The main part of my paper deals with four issues: deterrence, arms control, defence and disarmament. I have a differentiated view about these, but I'm critical of all. I think we have to accept deterrence as a reality but it deserves our condemnation as a basis for policy, and I believe we have to get away from deterrence as a basis for policy because it may ultimately fail. If we rely on it heavily we may end up finding ourselves in a war which we did not want and which will be catastrophic. I favour arms control, within limits, and I favour disarmament. I would like to see very substantial disarmament, and I believe some kinds of arms control agreements have been helpful and there are others in prospect that I can envisage. To give you one example, I believe an agreement on limiting anti-satellite weapons would be desirable. I believe we could now go ahead with a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement. That would be advantageous to almost everyone. But I regard all of these efforts -- continued reliance on deterrence, emphasis on arms control, emphasis on disarmament and, above all, emphasis on perfect defence, as in many ways diversionary. They hold out, when they are advocated without reservation or with little reservation, false hopes of a way out of our problem. The perfect defence is the worst example. The perfect defence --the Star Wars Defense, SDI -- is the ultimate example of holding out the hope of a technical solution to what are funamentally political problems. The real basis for our difficulties are political differences -- sources of grievance, many of them legitimate, in this world. Those have to be dealt with. As long as we hold out the hope that we can survive by having a perfect defence, or that we can survive by relying on deterrence coupled with some measures of arms control, or we hold out the hope that we can do so through disarmament without fundamental political change, it seems to me we are misleading ourselves and we are misleading the public throughout the world. And so I argue that it is time to face up to the necessity for greater emphasis on reducing the likelihood of crises and their early resolution. Now there's nothing original in this paper. All I suggest is change in emphasis -- that we have been overemphasizing certain approaches, in some of which there may be some merit, but which I believe divert out attention from the most important things we need to do.

VLADIMIR F. PETROVSKY, Head, International Organizations Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now Deputy Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union.

I agree with the preceding speakers who spoke of arms control as one of the chief routes we must take in order to ensure strategic stability. For me, at least, it goes without saying that this is the main thoroughfare. Still, we cannot treat the problems of arms limitation and disarmament in some sort of political vacuum. They are a part of a much more complicated picture of the world today, which is characterized not only by divergency but also by growing interdependence. And just because of this interdependence we should not omit these factors. I understand that there will be further discussion of technological developments from the standpoint of the prospects for arms limitation, but even at this stage I would like to note, from a political standpoint, and looking at the question not only from a historical perspective but from the perspective of the future, that we should take into account that, with the development of new technology we will be put at the mercy of incidents. As the tragic accident that has befallen Challenger has just shown, the computers and technologies are not perfect, and with the growing reliance on technology, the growing reliance on computers, it seems to me we will become more and more dependent on technical factors. And under these conditions we should take into account, when we approach the question of strategic security, that we cannot rely either on offensive or defensive systems. They cannot provide strategic security any more. In my view, there is only one answer, one alternative to the military solution, a political one. But I will speak on these matters later.

Again, in dealing with the problem of technological developments, we cannot put aside the human or the subjective factor -- how countries behave. And I think this question is of particular importance today, when we see that certain countries which bear the main responsibility for international peace and security behave improperly, in a less than civilized way. What will the consequences be if this takes place after the development of new weapons? This subjective factor has to be taken into account in assessing the situation.

There is another important factor about which my colleagues have spoken in much detail -- and I consider this also an important part of the picture of the world today which must be taken into account -- the distressing condition of the developing countries. This is a source of many conflicts today. It is not enough to look at this only from a historical point of view, that is to see it is the result of the colonial plundering of entire continents which left behind a heritage of unbelievable backawrdness, but it is important to look at it from the point of view of present day practices. In this connection one of the most important problems is that of the debt of these countries, and we should deal with this very seriously if we want to provide strategic stability for the world ahead. In this context I agree with those experts who consider that there is an irrefutable causal connection between the trillion-sized debt of these countries and the more than trillion-sized growth of military expenditures over the last few years in a certain country. Some experts also consider that if the plans for Star Wars are not stopped, the burden of the developing countries will grow, and these countries will actually be put in the position of subsidizing these Star War programmes. So, in considering the question of strategic stability we should look at the situation of Third World countries not only to deal with the conflicts but to deal with the major roots which give rise to these conflicts. This is the environment in which developments with regard to arms limitation and disarmament will take place.

On the other hand, of course, on the map of the routes which lead to common security, the main thoroughfare is arms limitation and disarmament. We were asked here to take as a starting-point the divergencies of viewpoint in current arms limitation negotiations. I must say that the situation in this respect must give us grounds for concern. I do not want to go into the reasons for this. I think if we start to go into these reasons it will be very difficult to find common ground. That is not the point. But looking at this situation one fact cannot fail to be disturbing, and this fact is, I would say, a new trend which is developing in negotiations. These negotiations today remind me of the slogan, "art for art's sake." In aesthetics that is a matter of taste. But in the field of diplomacy it has very bad consequences. The situation today is becoming more and more paradoxical, because the tempo of negotiations is lagging behind the tempo of the military build-up. We speak a lot about the need not to be too radical in the field of disarmament, to take certain moderate steps, and so on, but we do nothing of that kind with regard to the military build-up. With the military build-up the green light is on, while in negotiations there are a lot of yellow and even red lights. This is paradoxical.

I think from this point of view we should treat arms negotiations and the military build-up in the same way. If we are not going ahead with negotiations, we should stop the military build-up too. There is some sort of connection. Otherwise, the military build-up will leave negotiations far behind. I personally do not make a great distinction between arms limitation and disarmament, about which Professor Rathjens spoke -- though I would say I prefer disarmament as the most radical solution. And for me recent years have shown that disarmament is becoming less utopian, less of an ultimate goal. It is becoming realistic in the sense that through the many years of negotiations some kind of consensus is developing. At least all the proposals have been out on the negotiating table, and countries know each other's positions. Professor Rathjens mentioned, for example, the proposal made by Moscow for the complete liquidation of nuclear armaments by the year 2000. I will tell you quite frankly that, although these proposals were made by Moscow they are not proposals by Moscow alone. What we tried to do in these proposals was to combine the different ideas. We tried to take into account the United States approach -- it was the President of the United States who declared that his aim was to liquidate nuclear weapons within 15 years. We took his ideas very seriously, and we have great sympathy for this approach of President Reagan's. So we propose that instead of spending 15 years in creating outer-space weapons that we start to deal seriously with this matter. We took into account the position of France and the United Kingdom; we took into account very seriously China's position with regard to nuclear disarmament, and our proposal is actually a compilation of the positions of different countries.

There is another element which shows that this proposal is not utopian. If previously our country put forward the idea of general and complete disarmament it was in terms of general aims, without any specification. Now we have put on the table a schedule for the elimination of weapons which puts these proposals completely and organically within the framework of ongoing negotiations. Our intention is to use the existing framework. Of course, if there are matters which require a new approach, we are willing to accept that too. For example, Western European countries expressed great concern about conventional armaments. We understood that concern, and that is why we have proposed a new approach. We are open to any solution. But what I think is important in these matters is to start to look in practical terms, as Dr. Prawitz put it, at what is to be done about security, and to find the answers in practical deeds. We have had enough of declarations, of words. It is necessary to concentrate on specific deeds, first in the next four years, and then to go by at least five-year stages in order to reach a very tangible result by the year 2000.

GEOFFREY PEARSON

One of our speakers this morning, Dr. Prawitz, believes in arms control, and one, Professor Rathjens, does not. Dr. Rathjens ended with a plea for diplomacy which I approve. I'm not sure that he had any advice to give us, those of us who have been trying to improve relations between the 160 States that make up the United Nations. He left the problem at the beginning rather than the end, if I may say so. I think that's the typical view of an American academic, who once thought that arms control was important and now thinks that it's unimportant, but who never heard of diplomacy. Maybe that's a bit unfair, but you know we have been trying to do these things, that is, keep conflicts under control, for many, many years, and the problem is not to be told that it's important but how to do it. I think we have made some progress because, after all, we haven't had an East-West conflict for forty years, and while it's true there have been many conflicts elsewhere, they haven't been of the kind that one might have predicted in 1945. So something must have happened: either nuclear weapons prevent conflict or diplomats help to prevent it. Diplomacy works. And the question is not so much whether deterrence will work over the next 30 years but whether diplomacy will continue to work. But I think that question is mainly for tomorrow. On the question of the influence of new weapons and new weapons technologies both Dr. Prawitz and Professor Rathjens agreed that new weapons are creating new problems for the control of conflict, and I would like to ask you how seriously you take that problem. Both of you tended to say that there is a kind of blurring between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, that we're entering a stage where new accuracies and new technologies generally will lead to a greater danger of conflict, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, because of the types of weapons that are being produced. If this is going to happen, are there certain types of weapons that we should be mainly concerned about before the year 2000? Neither of you really said what it is we should be trying to prevent in terms of weapons developments.

GEORGE RATHJENS

I would like to comment very briefly. First of all, I don't want to discount what diplomacy has accomplished. I cited in my paper three examples where I think the diplomats have been far more successful in dealing with the political problems than with the technical ones. I cited the very dramatic change in the relationship between the United States and China, for which I give great credit to Henry Kissinger and President Nixon; the change in the relationship between Israel and Egypt, for which I would give great credit to Presidents Carter and Sadat; and the negotiations, now over thirty years ago, which led to the resolution of the status of Austria, which I regard as more important than any arms control agreement. So I don't discount what the diplomats have done at all, and I don't think I'm totally unaware of what they've done. All I say is, more power to them, and let's have more of the same. I would argue that, in the near term, it seems to me far more important to deal with the problems in Afghanistan and Central America than the SS-18 or the MX problems, for example.

Now, to turn to the second part of your question, what should we be doing about the arms; it does seem to me there are things we can do that would be constructive. But I fear we focus mostly on the wrong end of the spectrum in dealing with those issues of nuclear weapons and strategic arms. The kinds of issues that I feel greater concern about are the development of conventional weapons that can destroy nuclear delivery systems, and the retention of systems that can deliver either conventional or nuclear ordnance, and which become attractive targets, thereby blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weaponry and, in my opinion, making escalation more likely. Now, very frankly, I'm extremely pessimistic about constraining the development of highly accurate munitions through arms control negotiations. Munitions such as the Exocet, which is the one example I gave this morning -- but there are many others -- are far more troublesome, again, than are weapons like the SS-18. And, again, I think that the retention of aircraft carriers and surface navies and the deployment of large weapons, attractive as targets, in Europe, is very worrying. And I'm very skeptical about our reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, and with other countries -- Exocet is, after all, a French weapon, and there are other nations, Israel, for example, involved in developing these highly accurate weapons -- very skeptical about constraining the development of those weapons through agreement. Yet it does seem to me that if any weapons are important in making the escalation of conflict more likely it is those weapons, more than the large intercontinental systems, that are worrying.

EDWARD C. LUCK, President, United Nations Association of the United States

I don't know what the proper answer is to the implications of increasing accuracy of conventional weapons. But I would be interested in the response of both Mr. Prawitz and Mr. Rathjens to what is sometimes said -- that precision-guided munitions in fact make defence in Europe and elsewhere more viable on a conventional level, and therefore make the nuclear threshold less likely to be crossed, and also that, in terms of conventional conflict, they tend to favor defensive forces because relatively cheap precision guided munitions can, as you pointed out, attack warships, or fighter bombers, or armored forces that are more expensive and are generally used in an offensive mode. Also, the emphasis on things like area weapons for conventional forces may mean that certain military tasks can be accomplished without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, it may not be a simple one-way relationship, as you suggest, but something a bit more complex. I am not a weapons specialist, and I really don't know which side of the argument has the greatest weight. I would be interested in how both of you react to that.

JAN PRAWITZ

Seen from the perspective of a small country whose military forces are for purely defensive purposes, I think the main problem is the continuously increasing sophistication of weaponry, which makes it more and more expensive. For this, and other reasons, it becomes more and more difficult for a small country to keep up. Therefore, it should be in the interest of the smaller countries to level off the development of conventional weapons by international agreement. Otherwise, the general balance of power on the European continent will develop to the disadvantage of the smaller countries. If this can't be done, and we go on in this way to the year 2000, then the present role of the non-nuclear powers in Europe may change. They have a role today because they geographically separate the blocs. If you look at a map of Europe you will see that the problems arise where there are no neutral contries separating the blocs. This geographical distance will become less and less important if these technological developments continue.

GEORGE RATHJENS

I think there is a great truth in what Mr. Luck said. But the problem is that we persist in retaining targets for those precision-guided weapons, targets that become very attractive if one is concerned about a nuclear strike. The SS-20 missile is a good example. Here is a missile that, in a few years, presumably, can be destroyed with conventional ordnance. The Pershing is another example. Cruise missiles are other examples. All the ships that carry conventional or nuclear ordnance become exceedingly attractive targets if one is concerned about escalation and if one believes that they can be destroyed with conventional weapons, thereby forcing the burden of escalation onto the adversary. So that much of what you say about the virtues of precision-guided weapons would be true if we would choose to eliminate the targets that those precision-guided weapons could destroy. But, quite the contrary, we persist in multiplying the number of those targets, and in giving many of those targets dual capabilities. It's a synergism that goes with having precision-guided weapons and targets, that is, weapons systems that can deliver conventional, nuclear or chemical ordnance, the use of which becomes both very attractive and worrisome in a time of crisis.

ARCHELAUS TURRENTINE, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

I would agree with the point that precision weapons have cut both ways. In order to deal with specific targets there has been a shift in the last decade away from tactical nuclear weapons and towards more precise conventional weapons, and I think this is basically a good trend. I think the point Dr. Rathjens made is valid also. As long as very tempting targets remain there is a problem. I think there is a shift away from providing these very tempting targets, but I think it will take time, and I'm not sure it can be negotiated, it will perhaps just evolve.

With regard to the strategic arms control issue, I would say that, certainly from the US perspective, it is the top priority, and I think it would be better to have a more stable balance at a significantly lower level. I don't argue that this would resolve the problem of nuclear arms, but I think it would indeed be better, and would be a rational thing to do.

With regard to the point made about the Strategic Defense Initiative, and that people argued that it would be without leakage -- I know of no one I have dealt with, at least on the technical side, within the Government, who has argued that it would be leakproof, or indeed that it would ever be possible to have a totally leak-proof system in which you could have high confidence. Nevertheless, I think it makes a certain amount of sense at least to examine the possibilities that might exist here. I think that in the end it might possibly lead to a more stable situation. The transition from an offense-only to an offense-defence mode would require very careful handling to avoid unnecessary risk, but I think that right now all one is talking about is examining the feasibility of such an approach.

With regard to the question of SLCMs as presenting a particularly dangerous kind of development in terms of tempting targets, I'm not sure that I see much difference in having tactical weapons, that is the SLCMs, on board a ship and having the current generation of tactical nuclear weapons also on board ship. I don't see that this changes the situation a great deal. One can analyze the danger of naval conflict, but I think that's quite a different matter from regarding tactical nuclear weapons on ships as being the equivalent of the strategic systems that might come under threat.

RODDICK B. BYERS, Director, Research Program in Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto

So far we have generally been talking about the near-term problems of the strategic environment: that is, what are the current problems with respect to different types of weapons, whether they be GLCMs or SLCMs. In that sense, the discussion so far is very much along the lines of the traditional kind of arms limitation or strategic studies conference. Nothing has really been said as yet about what sort of security environment we want to live in the year 2000, and as we proceed to the year 2010. The near-term issues we have been discussing, while interesting, are only important, as far as I'm concerned, from that perspective. If we continue with the current discussion, I would have said that the major question we should be dealing with is whether or not the two superpowers are going to proceed along a path of unilateral security or whether they're going to try to reach some agreement regarding the requirements for mutual security. The tendencies in both the United States and the Soviet Union suggest that in some respects there is no agreement at all vis-à-vis the requirements for mutual security in the year 2000, and from the strategic perspective, both countries appear bent on pursuing, in varying degrees, unilateral security. If some understanding can be reached of the unilateral versus mutual security discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, then it is possible to address what is required to operationalize the security environment from a strategic perspective, and once you've done that, it seems to me, for better and for worse, you're back to talking about operationalizing deterrence in a way that allows for mutual and stable security in the year 2000. It is somewhat ironic that the only proposal to counteract our understanding of deterrence is President Reagan's vision of assured survival, which virtually everyone rejects as being unrealistic. If that is so, it seems to me, we are back to the question of what sort of doctrine and what sort of capabilities one is looking at in terms of the operationalization of deterrence for the rest of this decade and through the end of the century.

MILJAN KOMATINA, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference

I agree with the statement by the Moderator this morning that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line between the military and political aspects of stability. I am one of those who believe that strategic stability can only be a security concept if we look at it in a comprehensive way, that is, in both military and non-military terms. Discussions such as this have meaning only if they help to clarify notions which sometimes seem simple, clear and obvious but really are more complex than they appear to be. However, if we do not set ourselves long-term goals, such as disarmament, a change in inter-state relations, or even changes in the social structure of states themselves, then I think the intermediate goals have to be discussed within clear frameworks. Even if we agree that we have to live with deterrence, as Dr. Rathjens said, we must put to ourselves two or three questions. One is how to arrest its erosion, that is, how to prevent the evolution from mutual vulnerability to mutual invulnerability, how to reduce deterrence to lower levels, and there I see great merit in reductions, in a freeze, especially in a test ban, and so on.

A second question is, how to prevent the creation of new systems of weapons. Even if deterrence is accepted as a basic peacekeeping strategy, the creation of new weapons systems is regarded as an effort to achieve superiority, hence the erosion of deterrence.

The third framework consists of the need to clarify the strategic equation. The strategic equation is realistically dominated by the nuclear dimension, but I think, at least it is so for Europe but to a great extent for the rest of the world, that the equation is also both chemical and conventional weapons. I am far from equating these with nuclear weapons, but I think, realistically, we cannot move forward in the nuclear sphere unless we deal with both chemical and conventional weapons.

The last domain where we can act immediately is that of confidence and security-building measures. These are, of course, not a substitute for disarmament, but they can be steps towards it. They obviously cannot be successful unless arms control or disarmament or arms limitation becomes an integral part of foreign policy instead of a technical branch only understandable for insiders.

TIMOTHY W. STANLEY, President, International Economic Studies Institute,
Washington, D.C.

Taking Mr. Byers' point that we do want to look ahead to the year 2000 -- which is what my own paper is about -- it seems to me that a key element of strategic stability has to be removal of the fear on the part of the superpowers that the other will attain a meaningful first-strike capacity. Not, I think, that either superpower anticipates such a strike being made, but the political perceptions of the ability affect the over-all correlation of forces and indeed the structure of the political world. So it seems to me it is not ridiculous to address the question, looking that far ahead, of whether a mix of offensive deterrence and defensive ballistic missile defences of some sort cannot play a constructive role in that kind of strategic stability. I find that Mr. Rathjens portrayal of SDI as a 100 percent or zero proposition is a straw man, as Mr. Turrentine pointed out. If only on the basis of Murphy's law -- which stipulates that anything that can go wrong will go wrong -- it is, to me at least, ridiculous to conceive of 100 percent leakproof defense. But that is not to say that in this context of strategic stability even a 60 to 70 percent level of confidence in the defence would not sufficiently complicate the targeting of a potential attacker to the point where he cannot know which of his missiles will in fact get through. Consequently, he cannot plan, and the chain of deterrence reasoning goes on from there.

The second point is that there are of course at the present time variants of strategic defence which include extensions of the ABM Treaty to provide for the defence of silos and offensive missile systems in restricted ways, and while I'm not necessarily advocating that, I think it's something we should not simply rule out by assuming that strategic defence is merely an aberration in the thinking of one particular president. And I must say that, apart from its pros and cons, and contrary to what Mr. Rathjens was saying, there is in the United States a constituency which is growing very rapidly, and which is not so much the military-industrial complex as it is the industrial-research complex.

PIERRE LELLOUCHE, Associate Director, Institute of International Relations,
Paris

What I would like to try to do is address the question which was put to us, namely, what will the military situation be like at the turn of the century, and what kind of implications can be usefully derived for negotiations and for the role of the UN.

On the military situation, I think that the new phenomenon, which we are beginning to live through, and which will develop increasingly in the years to come, is the gradual erosion of the role of nuclear deterrence as the primary element of international security. Now I know that there are some people in this room who have been fighting nuclear weapons for a very long time and oppose them for a variety of political, ethical or moral reasons. But in my view, and I think in the view of many people in my country, it is nuclear weapons, like it or not, which have ensured peace and strategic stability, at least among those powers who have the most weapons and who are the most able to fight wars. And it is no accident if there has been no war among those great powers, whereas there have been something like 200 conflicts in areas of the world which were not covered by nuclear deterrence. Thus strategic stability, so far, has been a direct function of the nuclear age, and to be more precise, of the zones of the world which are covered by nuclear weapons. Unpleasant as it may be, from a 'moral' point of view, that is a fact.

But new developments are emerging, challenging this reality. Looking down the road toward the end of the century, and at what technologies are being developed on the military side, the supremacy of nuclear weapons is being directly challenged across the board. First of all, we are moving into an age of vulnerability of all the components of nuclear power and weapons, land-based, air-based and potentially sea-based as well. Second, we are moving into a world in which there will be an increased problem of interference and reliability with command and communication related to nuclear weapons. Third, we are moving into a world in which nuclear delivery systems, either air breathing or ballistic, will have a harder time penetrating to their targets. Finally, we are moving to a variety of developments in non-nuclear fields--space and conventional weapons in particular--which will further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the power posture in various regions. All of which, of course, is at an increased economic cost for all countries involved, since as is well known, nuclear deterrence is far cheaper than only a conventional defense policy (typically nuclear weapons investments represent only a fraction -15 to 20%- of defense expenditures in nuclear weapons states).

Now, what are the military consequences of this? The military consequences are unfortunately quite negative, to the extent that we are going to move toward a much more fragile nuclear relationship. It is not, as President Reagan promised, that we are going to go to a 'post-nuclear' world. Nuclear arms won't be 'disinvented', our future world will still be nuclear. But nuclear weapons will be far less important, far more vulnerable, far more difficult to use than they were in the past. All this is leading to a strategic situation where nuclear deterrence will be less of an insurmountable obstacle to the use of force, since it will be harder to actually exercise, and easier to circumvent through other military means.

What all this tends to do is to channel the risk of conflict at the sub-nuclear level, and certainly at the sub-strategic nuclear level, in many regions of the world including Europe. And, as a European, that is what I worry about. I worry about the trends that I see in American strategic thinking, as well as Soviet strategic thinking, towards what they call the conventionalization of war, namely, the notion that one can fight a war with conventional weapons and not have to escalate at some point to nuclear weapons. Now, I have heard our colleague from ACDA say that this might be seen as stabilizing. I find it eminently destabilizing. In the same vein, I equally worry about the de-nuclearization rhetoric now being used increasingly in superpowers arms control, particularly when it is applied to the European situation. Parallel to this emerging technological horizon, another long-term trend which we are beginning to see is that of the increased diffusion of power on a global scale, again at the sub-nuclear level and in areas other than Europe and the superpowers. Already there is a massive transfer of very modern conventional weapons to Third World regions, combined with the beginning of clandestine or semi-clandestine proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons. All this combined with a situation in which obviously neither superpower is in a position to control regional conflicts, as they used to do in the past. So we are moving into a situation which will be harder to manage, and in which the risk of big powers being drawn into local conflicts will be higher. The situation we had very recently with Libya (in April 1986) certainly points to the kind of situation we will have increasingly in the future.

Now what does this mean in terms of arms control or disarmament negotiations? Again, as I said earlier, since nuclear weapons were really the key to strategic stability, it was quite natural for those who invented arms control - basically in the 1960s and basically in American universities - to focus essentially on nuclear weapons. So what we have had in the past 25 years is a major effort to deal with the nuclear situation, and I would say a major ideology linked to arms control and essentially targeted at dealing with the nuclear problem. I think that this methodology and philosophy has been totally overtaken by events. Whereas in the pure nuclear deterrence world one could develop the notion that the superpowers, even if they disagreed on ideology, could still have a shared interest in reducing nuclear arms, this is much less the case if they don't know where we are going technologically, and what role nuclear weapons will have in the future. In the past we had negotiations that could readily be based on clear-cut distinctions between conventional and nuclear, and even if you took the category of nuclear weapons, you had a whole series of clear-cut distinctions according to kinds of weapons, according to range, according to the performance of certain weapons. Today technology is changing all that. As has been noted before, the distinction between the range and the types of weapons is gone, and this raises enormous verification problems which are quite frankly insoluble at this stage. Perhaps the best evidence of what I'm describing is the situation of the so-called NST talks in Geneva, in which essentially you have two countries grappling with the fact that there cannot be an agreement at this point because no one knows what kind of technology there will be ten years down the line especially in the defensive area. And anybody with a bit of good sense knows that neither an American general nor a Soviet general, nor a French or an Indian or a 'whatever' general would agree to cut down offensive systems if he doesn't know what kind of defense environment he will have to face ten years down the line. And yet that's exactly the problem. So we shouldn't be surprised if the Geneva negotiations are stuck, and they are going to remain stuck as long as the technological picture is not clarified and we have reasonably precise knowledge and understanding of the kind of technological environment we are going to face.

Now the implications for priorities for negotiation in the future follow from what I've just said. First of all I would say that the arms control ideology, which is centred around the elimination of nuclear weapons, is basically wrong. That's not where I would begin. I've heard with great interest Mr. Gorbachev's January 1986 proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the turn of the century. I'm not sure that's where I would start. Anyway, those weapons, are going to become more and more irrelevant in the actual conduct of conflict and diplomacy. Where I would start, however, is on what creates the problem and the need for nuclear weapons in the first place, and that is the increased conventional imbalances in certain areas of the world (particularly in Europe), the drive to improve those weapons and to move them into areas of technology which we don't even understand yet. So I would say that the first priority should be to deal with conventional and chemical weapons, in the regional context. Second, priority should also be given to limiting the proliferation of chemical and conventional weapons in Third-World areas. Third, I would try, to the extent possible, to find ways in which the international community can co-operate in keeping so-called Third World conflicts under control. My main cause of concern for the future is not linked to the continuation of the nuclear arms race (as wasteful and unnecessary as it may be) but to situations in which smaller countries, highly armed with modern weapons, would be in a position where they could draw big countries into a war situation. It seems to me that the whole question of international terrorism, at the moment, is one area where there are common grounds between East and West, very much like the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is one area which very much needs to be tackled by the countries involved in order to avoid uncontrollable escalation. And I would put as much stress on the control of Third World conflicts as I would on the continuation of arms control negotiations.

So my plea is, number one, to try to understand that nuclear weapons are not the absolute enemy of stability -- in fact they might be the opposite -- number two, that in the future the priority of arms negotiations should be to establish stability at the conventional level and to tackle technological development rather than being constantly overtaken by them, and, number three, that we should really focus, as part of the disarmament exercise, on continuing Third World conflict and tension, which has the potential of really being the trigger of a major catastrophe.

MILOS VEJVODA, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations Office at Geneva

There are two things which are harmful to strategic stability. The first is a lack of mutual trust -- but this is in the political field, and perhaps I will say something about that problem later. The second is the search for an ultimate weapon which will either ensure superiority or make all weapons obsolete. So far as the technical development of weapons is concerned, it seems to me that the lessons of history are clear. We can never be certain what new possibilities may emerge through the development of science, and we should not try to be too wise in predicting the future. There will always be new developments in arms technology, and there will always be hopes that an ultimate weapon is on the way. But that is not the way to reach an agreement. It is up to governments to decide that it is impossible to find an ultimate weapon, or to achieve a first-strike capability, and if all governments take that decision we negotiators will be able to conclude disarmament treaties.

ALESSANDRO CORRADINI, Former Director and Deputy to the Assistant-Secretary-General, United Nations Centre for Disarmament

Several speakers have raised the question of chemical and conventional weapons, and they did so very rightly. In my view those weapons are an integral part of the strategic balance, an integral part of the stability equation we are trying to envisage for the year 2000. Of the two branches of weapons, I think that conventional weapons are even more important strategically than chemical weapons. No country in the world has based its strategy on chemical weapons; they are a sort of supplementary system which could, certainly, have a large role in determining the outcome of conflicts with conventional weapons, but no country in the world would lose anything strategically if these weapons were eliminated. So I think the Conference on Disarmament should concentrate on this question of the elimination of chemical weapons. An agreement on that subject would be a great omen for progress on the questions of conventional and nuclear weapons. And if no progress is made towards the elimination of chemical weapons, I'm afraid that progress in the other areas of conventional and nuclear weapons will become even more difficult.

The second point I want to make is this. I agree entirely with Dr. Byers that we must speak about the security environment of the year 2000, and not simply talk about weapons. We have an overabundance of weapons, and we have very few political ideas to cope with the problems of the end of this century and of the new millenium. So I think we should speak about the political environment for a just peace for all the nations of the world by the end of this century and into the third millenium.

I think we should talk also about the meaning of arms control, and the concrete role we wish to assign to arms control in the establishment of a just peace. We must also come to an agreement about the role of technology in security. Here, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a speech to the Canadian Parliament in 1985, gave us direction. He said that technology must not be the master but the servant of human destiny, and I think that this is very important. We cannot continue to consider technology as the master of our future. Certainly technology has a role, even a vital role, but we must restrain it. And if we do not restrain it, arms control means nothing. This is my view.

I think that we must also, in our discussion, address the political problems which were summed up in a formula, which was also a cri de coeur on the part of Prime Minister Trudeau, when he received the Einstein Peace Prize. He spoke of the "primacy of politics over technology, over militarism, over nuclear accountancy." I think that these words can guide us in our discussion.

MANFRED MUELLER, Professor, Academy of Political Science and Legal Studies, Institute of International Relations, Potsdam

Professor Mueller introduced his paper entitled "Strategic Stability and Europe", which argued that modern weapons had made the possibility of a major war in Europe inconceivable and that stability and peace in Europe could only be achieved if all states on the continent based their policy on that insight. The full text of the paper has been published in Disarmament, (Vol. IX, No. 2)

BENOIT D'ABOVILLE, Deputy Director of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

I wonder if we are not all going a bit overboard on technology and the future. Basically, the year 2000 is quite close, and in terms of including armaments into actual military inventories, with the time needed for training and incorporation at the operational level, I think fifteen years is quite a short time. Most of the weapons that will be in military inventories at the beginning of the next century are already known, if not fully developed. Therefore, we should be rather prudent,and keep in mind that from a scientific development to actual deployment there is a long lead-time, and there are a lot of systems that never survive their childhood and adolescence.

We must remember also that uncertainty about the performance of a new system is in itself a very large element of stability. Clausewitz was very right in putting a lot of emphasis on the consequences of the friction of war, and even the anticipation of the friction of war. Systems which do not work completely as planned are an element which deter military and political leaders from taking risks. That doesn't mean that I disagree with a lot of what has been said here -- only that we need to keep these matters in perspective.

There is a further consideration. You cannot really negotiate an agreement, you cannot really close a door, without leaving an escape hatch. Every agreement always includes the clause, 'rebus sic stantibus', and therefore a treaty will never survive a technological or political change. It is, perhaps, one of the great faults of the arms control of the 60s and 70s that the exclusive preoccupation with strategic nuclear weapons was achieved at the cost of other types of nuclear weapons and other forms of armaments. Therefore we should be very cautious in assessing fundamental change. I really share the view of Pierre Lellouche -- things will evolve, there will be more factors of instability which are non-related to nuclear weapons, precisely because of the change in the role of the nuclear weapon -- but the change will not be radical, we will not enter into a new world, and the political framework will remain more or less the same.

One also has to take a middle-of-the-road position in assessing SDI. If it is unworkable or impossible, why be so excited about it? If, on the contrary, it is so efficient, and is the sure wave of the future, then there is no hope of reaching an agreement, because no one will abandon what is the way to the future. The reality, as everyone knows, is much more complicated; there are a lot of factors involved in any decision to deploy a system, and that is an element which makes the road from here to the next century a much more interesting landscape.

ROLF HOFSTETTER, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

If I were to be asked what I mean by strengthening strategic stability, by making it better than we have now, I would say that we should aim at a condition in which war between East and West is excluded, and by war I would mean not only nuclear but conventional war. Reference was made to the devastating effects of conventional war, and I suppose that for us in Europe such a war would be simply the end. But I don't want to go into conventional disarmament; perhaps we will have an opportunity to discuss that tomorrow.

Another feature of the situation with regard to strengthened stability, in my mind, would be that it is characterized by more co-operative efforts than we have now. And I wouldn't apply that to arms control alone; there would have to be more co-operation on a whole range of questions, more dialogue. Now we won't have this sort of ideal state of co-operation overnight. We have to start somewhere, and I think we have a few arms control fora where we are at present negotiating. Perhaps, as was said this morning, it might have been better to negotiate about something else, but now we have these fora -- CDE, MBFR, CD, the bilateral negotiations in Geneva. But for me, at least, the time has now come where, in one of these fora, one has to show that co-operation, be it only in one area, is possible. From then on one could build. But I don't suppose we will have strategic stability if we don't have more co-operation, particularly between East and West.

ANDREI V. KOZYREV, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR

So far this discussion has proceeded in general political terms. But I would like to suggest a specific example of almost everything that has been said before. The year 2000 is not very far away, and space capabilities give striking evidence of that. We now have new space capabilities which are appearing almost everywhere, in the Soviet Union, in the United States and in other countries. Many countries are now becoming space powers. What can be done with these space capabilities? It is now within the power of governments, of politicians to decide what road is to be taken in developing or using them. And this is a very specific matter. For example, one road that can be taken for the remaining years of this century is suggested by SDI: to develop so-called defensive weapons. But there are many myths about space capabilities. One is that research is some sort of pure exercise which would produce results only in five or ten or fifteen years. But this research involves weapons of some kind. For example, right now, we have new ASAT capabilities. What would these new space strike weapons be? They are appearing right now. Again, there are new capabilities in laser weapons, in kinetic weapons, and so on. Research on the scale which is now provided in the United States will be more concrete than many people think.

The other myth concerns the defensive nature of those outerspace weapons. It is very hard to distinguish between defensive and offensive weaponry. As Tom Wicker once noted, just as a primitive warrior with a shield and a sword had an offensive advantage over one with a sword but no shield, so the defensive capabilities in space would provide offensive advantage for one side, and even Mr. Weinberger reported to President Reagan that a Soviet defence would "require us to increase the number of our offensive forces and their ability to penetrate Soviet defences." And of course the same applies in reverse. So the research leads not only to so-called defensive anti-missile capabilities but to ASAT capabilities. There is no Chinese wall between the two. But, even more, the so-called space weapons which are now under research would lead to a capability to strike air and even earth targets. Under the SDI programme there are four basic lines of development of so-called defensive weapons: kinetic energy weapons, electromagnetic weapons, beam weapons and laser weapons, and only one category of these four, the beam weapons, are not supposed to be capable of use against earth, because they cannot penetrate the atmosphere. But all three of the others, at a certain degree of development, will be able to penetrate the atmosphere and to be used as a purely offensive weapon with the capability of striking ground targets.

That is one road and one possibility of using space technology and space capability. But it will lead us by the year 2000 to strategic chaos. It will inevitable wreck the ABM Treaty, it would inevitably wreck other treaties which now govern the space regime, and it will lead us to wars in space.

But there is another road, and there is no fatality of technology. You cannot stop technological progress, and you cannot stop the enterprises, whether private or not, from using these space capabilities. But let us now recommend, since it is our purpose here as experts to recommend, another road to get to the year 2000, and that is the use of space capabilities to benefit everyone, to benefit all countries. And here I would suggest that just as there are practical means of using space capabilities even today for military purposes, so there are specific openings now to use almost the same technologies to develop peaceful uses of outer space, for example, communication facilities. Space also offers us an opportunity to enter the third millenium as a united earth.

VLADIMIR F. PETROVSKY

I would like to make some comments on a number of points raised today which I think are very important from the standpoint of the task you have put before us, to look at the divergencies of viewpoint and to see if there are opportunities for overcoming them.

First, I would like to touch on the point raised by Professor Byers and Ambassador Komatina, which I think is actually one of the crucial questions we are facing today -- the question of the security environment we wish to have in the year 2000, and how we intend to achieve it. Here I agree with Mr. Lellouche, who has rightly said that in spite of differences of ideology, the Soviet Union and the United States -- and I would not limit myself only to these two countries, actually -- share a common interest. President Reagan once said that if our planet were threatened by a landing from another planet the Soviet Union and the United States would quickly find a common language. But isn't a nuclear disaster a more tangible threat than a landing by extraterrestrials? Isn't the technological threat, or the need to help the Third World countries, which are in a truly desperate situation now, enough to make us find common ground? I do not want to sound utopian here. But my own experience in the field of arms control has shown me that whenever there is a deep understanding of the common interest, it is always possible to work and to co-operate very effectively.

So I think one of the common bases for further action should be a striving for strategic stability. But I do not wish to make a cult of strategic stability, and I think, in order to be sufficiently realistic, we should treat strategic stability not as an outcome of determinate phenomena but rather as a process. We should set for ourselves the task of lowering this strategic stability to the level of reasonable sufficiency, with the exclusion from the strategic balance of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

In this connection, I would not agree with Mr. Lellouche that the nuclear weapon is inevitable. I consider that in the world today, which is characterized by the development of science and technology, and which has forced us to think in new ways about the problems of peace and war, we have no choice but to try to establish strategic stability first of all through political means.

Now, since the centre of our concern today is the military aspect of stability, I would like to give my own answer to the question of what military arrangements we should seek to establish by the year 2000, and what military arrangements would provide a basis for security. Here I would enumerate five major elements which would provide the basis for military security in the year 2000.

First of all, I consider it very important for the nuclear powers to renounce war, both nuclear and conventional, against each other or against third countries. Sometimes one hears the objection that this would be a merely declaratory measure. But I would argue the contrary. My country has accepted the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and this was not only a solemn declaration made before the United Nations; it has practical consequences for our military doctrine. My colleague, Major General Batenin, will, I am sure, support me in this, and tell you that the acceptance of this obligation makes it necessary to make certain changes in military preparations, in training, and so on. This is not merely a declaration, therefore, it is a very practical step.

The second element necessary to lay a foundation for military security is prevention of the militarization of outer space. My colleague, Mr. Kozyrev, has spoken in detail on this matter. But we also consider that it is necessary as well as possible to carry out nuclear disarmament under the conditions of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This would, by the way, be the answer to those countries which object that there is some sort of nuclear club. This club will disappear as soon as nuclear disarmament is carried out, and this will be a step towards the increased democratization of international life. That is why such a step would have both military and political consequences.

But we do not see the year 2000 only as non-nuclear. We consider that it should be characterized by the disappearance of all weapons of mass destruction. From this point of view we attach great importance to the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons.

With regard to conventional weapons also, our idea is not to maintain them at existing levels. Mention has been made of our proposals in this area, and we are ready to start immediately to reduce the level of confrontation with regard to these weapons also, so as to bring them down to a level of reasonable sufficiency.

The fourth element in our proposals is the disbanding of the military alliances. We consider that these alliances do not help the stabilization of the military balance and therefore do not help to ensure security. I think a first step in this direction, which would be acceptable to both blocs, would be an agreement on their part not to enlarge their respective alliances.

The fifth and last element in this approach to building the basis for military security in the year 2000 -- and this is a matter which I think deserves much more thorough discussion -- is the balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets.

Through this block approach to providing security in the military field we would be able to create a new situation in the military field and to establish a solid basis of strategic stability by the year 2000.

From this point of view I agree completely with Dr. Hofstetter that a co-operative approach is needed. But in arms control, as in the theatre, you cannot applaud with one hand. A co-operative approach is needed -- but it must be co-operation not only in words but in practical action. Unfortunately, however, what sometimes happens in the practice of international relations is that certain countries are very active in the area of military initiatives. On the European scene, for example, I cannot find a single military development on which certain countries have not produced an initiative - the European defence initiative and others. There is an abundance of initiatives. But if there is so much room for initative in the one field, why is there no room for it in the other? What is needed is that the initiatives -- especially among the political people, the diplomats -- should be directed not towards finding military but political solutions. I think then we would be able to have a really co-operative approach which would help us to settle the very difficult questions we are facing today.

GEORGE RATHJENS

It seems to me that we have been talking about strategic stability for at least the last half-hour without explicitly recognizing that usually we think of it in two different senses, one relating to crisis stability and the other to arms race stability. Let me say a word about both.

When we talk about crisis stability we are concerned that in a crisis we will go to war and cause a major destruction of the earth's population. Now, people say, we've managed for thirty-five years or so without that happening, and therefore the situation has been very stable. Well, it hasn't been stable enough for my taste. I would remind you of President Kennedy's observation that during the Cuban missile crisis, he thought the chance of our going to war with nuclear weapons was somewhere between one-third and one-half. That's unacceptably high. Now I think he overestimated the likelihood, but he was closer to the situation than I was. If it's anywhere near that close in a period of thirty years that's much too high. So we should not comfort ourselves with the idea that we are in a situation of great crisis stability. It is too risky and, for reasons I discussed earlier, I think the risk will continue to grow because there will be more centres where conflicts can originate.

One more word on crisis stability. If I thought that we were going to deploy an SDI system that was 99 percent effective or something like that, I would find that a cause for concern from the crisis stability perspective. If we had a system that was that good I do believe that in a crisis there could be an impetus, assuming that the Soviet Union had the same kind of system, for one side or the other to try to interfere with the other's system, and that would perhaps lead to war. I discount that possibility because I cannot imagine a system that effective, and I can't imagine nuclear weapons systems becoming so effective as instruments for totally disarming the United States or the Soviet Union that we need to be worried particularly about them being a cause of crisis instability. In crisis stability terms, I worry about third parties getting us involved.

The other kind of stability we talk about is arms race stability, and we haven't known that at all. We've had a continuing arms race for all of these years, with the United States responding to what the Soviet Union does in terms of weapons, and the Soviet Union responding to what we do, and it's gone on and on, and it continues. And this is the real tragedy of SDI, in my view -- not that it's going to cause crisis instability but that it causes arms race instability. The Soviet Union has made it very clear -- and I believe it -- that if we proceed down this path of research and development, and perhaps construction of a limited kind of defense, that might introduce uncertainty about their ability to attack our missiles, the obvious answer is for them to build more missiles, or better missiles, or penetration aids, and they have said they would. And if they build defenses we will do the same thing. So in that sense we live in a world where we have known arms race instability for a very long time, and unless things change that will continue. Now that's wasteful in terms of resources, but it is also troublesome in that it has a second order effect: it causes all sorts of difficulties in terms of the relationships between the two countries, which indirectly may make us more likely to get into crises. I think it is useful to distinguish between these two kinds of instability as we continue this meeting.

FABIO MIGLIORINI

There seems to be an emerging agreement on the need for a co-operative approach, and I tried to emphasize this concept. Technological progress can hardly be delayed, but it can be used for the purpose of strengthening strategic stability. The situation not only is evolving but has always evolved. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence has changed. As a matter of fact, it has been decreasing for many years. We are worrying at present about the effects on future stability of research on nuclear defensive systems, but there have already been consequences for stability generated by technological advances in the field of offensive weapons. We now have more powerful and more precise nuclear weapons that might open the way for a first-strike capability, which would be most destabilizing. To restore stability it seems therefore that the offence-defence relationship has to be re-shaped through a co-operative approach by the two major powers.

Another element of the situation is the increasing importance of conventional weapons. Strategic stability is a complex concept; it has to take into account all the components of the military balance. The solution is mostly political. It can lead to technological choices and co-operative decisions on those choices capable of restoring strategic stability. On the road to complete disarmament, this can perhaps be achieved through a choice of the right mix of armaments, offensive and defensive, nuclear and conventional; a choice that should be such as to discourage aggression.

In the context of this co-operative approach, I think that both sides should keep in mind the requirements for security of the other side, and keep in mind that the other side has the right to an equal level of security. Here it seems to me that the measures which have been mentioned, such as the non-first use of nuclear weapons, or the disbanding of military alliances, do not keep this principle in mind, while other proposals, like the one concerning reductions in conventional weapons, might be suitable for this purpose. It is true also that the objective of conventional reductions must be pursued through balanced reductions which would ensure stability in this very important sector of armaments.

GEULI BATENIN, (interpretation), Major General, Ministry of Defence, Soviet Union

I would like to share with you some of my views on the military-technical side of the notion of strategic stability.

As a military man, and as one of those who are involved in "bean counting" in matters of military planning, I must say that strategic stability, as it has always been understood, is above all equality in the number and quality of weapons for each side involved -- but mostly numbers. Now, in the contemporary world, "bean counting" as between the Soviet Union and the United States, has always had in its core the central strategic systems of the two countries. That is in essence what the notion of strategic stability means, and it is the purpose of all the "bean counting" to determine whether or not strategic stability exists. This core is surrounded by other peripheral or regional indicators of stability. Although there are a number of these regional indicators, the most important of them is the situation in Europe, where two military groupings face each other, equiped for war, and that is why "bean counting" also takes place there, and also involves the question of strategic stability. Both sides in Europe possess both general purpose and battlefield nuclear weapons.

At present -- and this is accepted in the headquarters of both the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty alliances -- there is a certain equality, or parity, between the two sides. This equality or parity determines strategic stability, but only from the military point of view. When we talk about the strategic stability which exists between these two sides, and we try to define or determine it, we take into account the factors of time and space. It is the two physical categories of space and time that are used by the two general staffs to determine the indicators of strategic stability, which also constitutes the security of the two groupings of forces.

Now we are faced with the possibility of the disappearance of one of these categories -- that of time.

If we approach stability exclusively from a military point of view, then we can see that everything that we have done so far in weapons development, regardless of the advent of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, belongs to one historical era -- the era mankind has always known. This is so because the time necessary for any weapon to be delivered to its target is commensurate with home sapiens' speed of thought.

Everything that operates beyond this speed will belong to an entirely different era, an era in which man will be subordinated to a robot weapon, and deprived not only of time but also of space.

That is what will happen if, when the so-called research stage of the Strategic Defense Initiative has been completed, the monster of the nuclear-beam weapon, which is the cherished objective of Edward Teller, has been born. Without that beam there would be no need of SDI of any kind. Without that beam, such a programme would not produce a new generation of weapons of mass destruction. It is only this X-ray laser, which is a combination of a nuclear burst and a deadly beam, which will revolutionize everything that has been done and is still being done in the field of military theory and practice.

First of all, this new kind of weapon will deprive man of his right to think and take decisions. He simply will have no time to do that, since any laser beam performs on a micro-scale. In other words, it performs in nano-seconds, or billionths of a second. Man, who lives in a macro world, measuring his thoughts by days, hours, minutes and seconds, will become the slave of a weapon. The robot weapon will rule over people.

Secondly--and this is what I am leading to--could we then even raise the issue of strategic stability or any other kind of stability? This very notion, this military and political category, will lose any meaning whatsoever. That is why stability is possible today. That is why, as SDI is developed, stability is lost. That is why, once SDI has been carried out, stability will disappear.

It is because of this that what is needed now is a new philosophy of the world and a new military component of that philosophy--nuclear disarmament, reductions in conventional armaments, etc. What we need is a reasonable limit on the military forces of all.

PIERRE LELLOUCHE

I would like to put a few questions to General Batenin. I am not personally in favour of the reintroduction of strategic defences into the superpower equation. I do not see this as a stabilizing factor, nor do I see it as a great help for European security. That being said, however, I would like to ask the following questions. First of all, I was struck by the fact that General Batenin focused on one particular 'monster', the X-ray laser. Now, why is it that he focuses especially on this particular weapon, rather than all the other technologies and weapons that are being studied in the SDI programme? Does he make a particular distinction between these exotic technologies and more classic interception weapons like those that the Soviet Union has already deployed around Moscow and is still working on? I am referring to ground-based kinetic energy interceptors. Are those okay? In other words, is there implicit in his statement a distinction between two BMD technologies -- one that is acceptable, and on which there might later be a compromise with the Americans, that is to say, ground-based interception, and one that is not acceptable, that is, space-based beam weapons?

A second question. General Batenin also stressed in his statement the question of the time factor -- the fact that in an SDI system there would be virtually no time to manage a war situation. Could we not say that, precisely in such a circumstance those weapons, including nuclear weapons, would be totally unusable? There would be no circumstance in which any head of State, East or West, would be in a position to threaten to use nuclear weapons, simply because these would be totally unmanageable. In the end, if one is really interested in uncertainty, isn't the reintroduction of some defences in fact a stabilizing rather than a totally destabilizing factor? If I were an American, or even a Soviet, there might be a point at which some denial to the other side of its capability for preemptive strike could be seen as stabilizing. What does he think of that argument?

Finally, let me ask a question that has to do with disarmament. So far the Soviet Union has used general phrases such as the demilitarization of space, or a ban on research. But clearly, as the General knows, it's very difficult to ban research. What, concretely, can the Soviet Union propose to ban those technologies that the General has this morning identified as particularly destabilizing?

GENERAL BATENIN

I will start with the second question. Why is it that I chose to speak about the time factor? My statement in general was directed against the development of military technology. And it is because I believe that this particular monster, to which I referred, will deprive the general staffs in the first instance - since they do the military planning -- and then all of mankind of that vital factor. The second idea is that we do take a very radical stand with regard to disarmament in general, and nuclear disarmament in particular. I spoke of that, and I think also that, in taking this approach, we consider also that the most dangerous element in this illusion of strategic stability will actually ruin it.

As to outer space, of course it has been militarized to a certain degree. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have all kinds of satellites performing functions of observation, reconnaissance, early warning, and so on. But these types of systems in space were not and are not destabilizing. What would become destabilizing is a space strike weapon. Not the electromagnetic gun, because that is insignificant as compared with the laser beam based on highly concentrated energy.

As to the first question, which concerned the ABM system around Moscow, I must say that the existence of this system is not in contradiction with a state of strategic stability between the United Sates and the Soviet Union. In my opinion, that particular deployment does not detract from stability in the military sense. But, as a matter of principle, the Galosh system around Moscow is no problem for us at all; we are prepared to say goodbye to it, whether within the framework of the existing ABM Treaty or within a possible future agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. But this will have to be done, of course, on a basis of equality. Now the ball is in the US court. We do not want to touch the ABM Treaty today, because its very existence does help to regulate stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. But at the same time this situation should make those who are planning the development of SDI think twice about where this development of new military technology would lead us.

With regard to the specific question of a distinction between different ABM technologies, I must say frankly that I consider all ABM systems destabilizing, particularly when they exist alongside offensive nuclear weapons, because they introduce an element of uncertainty in military planning -- and I am not alone in this view. I am of course speaking in terms of the situation as it exists today. If we speak in terms of tomorrow, then all nuclear weapons are destabilizing, and they will become more destabilizing. So, to achieve more stability, we have to cut down on the offensive systems.

There is, of course, another factor to be considered; the fact that the nuclear weapons in existence today are the equivalent in destructive power to six thousand First World Wars. Another danger exists also; that our apprehensions concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons may push us into a conventional arms race, and science and technology do provide that possibility. The position of the Soviet Union on this matter is clear: we propose to cut down both nuclear and conventional weapons with a view to eliminating them, and this applies first of all to the arsenals of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. We do want to reduce them, and we are also prepared to remove them from all of our western districts. But this again would have to be done on a basis of equality, in other words, in a way that covers all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

I would like now to return to the idea I began with. If we can stop the development of weapons today, this would give us the possibility of retaining the time factor as one of the essential elements which ensure strategic stability. It doesn't matter that there are differences today concerning numbers and types of weapons or determining the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Incidentally, this was one of the arguments, or rather pseudo-arguments, advanced by the Western side in rejecting our proposal for a moratorium. These differences of view can and do exist, and can be and are discussed. The essential thing is that we do have time to do that. But even within the existing nuclear missile systems, we already have a limit on the time available for decision-making. We already have to face that problem. I think I have already made clear the implications of a complete elimination of the time factor.

So on our part we are proposing very radical solutions, solutions which should satisfy all tastes and views. But, to our great surprise, this radicalism on our part has found no great response among our Western colleagues.

This radicalism of ours also extends to good and solid measures of verification -- and this is a very important matter for us because we will be opening up our territory all the way to the Urals, while the territory of the United States remains untouched.

ROBERT BUDWINE, Nuclear physicist, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, USA;
director "Ettore Majorana" International Centre

In Mr. Kozyrev's statement yesterday the statement was explicitly made, and General Batenin has repeated it by implication today, that the X-ray laser, as well as other particle beams, could attack the surface of the earth. I believe this is a misconception, and if it is a misconception in Soviet thinking I believe it would be very important that they talk very carefully to their scientific people to see if it can be cleared up. The nuclear explosion-driven X-ray laser, even with directed beams, cannot penetrate the earth's atmosphere. This is a well-established, well-acknowledged fact in the West. I believe it would be the same in the Soviet Union. There is, in my opinion, a very important point related to this, on which negotiations could play a very important role. If there should be -- that is not our favourite mode of basing, but if there should be -- large numbers of nuclear explosions in orbit -- a space-based nuclear defense -- the danger is that they could be brought back into the earth's atmosphere and act as conventional nuclear warheads. The important thing negotiations could accomplish if either the East or the West should decide to employ a space-based X-ray system, would be to ensure that such a system did not have the capability for re-entry. This is something which should be reasonably verifiable, unless a special effort were made to conceal it. In other words, without a re-entry vehicle an orbiting nuclear explosion could not come back into the earth's atmosphere and reach targets on the ground.

MANFRED MUELLER (MODERATOR)

But could this nuclear explosion not destroy the ozone layer?

ROBERT BUDWINE

It would certainly cause effects in the atmosphere.

ANDREI KOZYREV

Dr. Budwine spoke of consulting Soviet scientists on this matter of the X-ray lasers. Well, the fact is that they have considered the question very carefully -- as may be seen from the report they issued recently on the feasibility of space-based weapons--and the conclusion they have reached is that it seems possible eventually to solve the problem of laser beam passage to the earth's surface with acceptable energy losses by means of proper selection of laser radiation wave-length.

But, apart from these technological or military aspects of the question, I would like to point out that, from the political point of view, the very development of the X-ray laser, which is to be space-based and have a nuclear blast as its power source, is a clear violation of existing treaties, and therefore absolutely intolerable. The Partial Test Ban Treaty clearly prohibits nuclear tests in space, and the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons in space, so that even the refraction of a nuclear blast on earth to outer space would violate the spirit if not the letter of the Outer Space Treaty and would certainly violate the Partial Test-Ban Treaty.

But there is a way to resolve this problem, and that is a comprehensive test ban, which would prevent the development of this very dangerous system and preclude the development of the X-ray laser as an anti-satellite or anti-ballistic missile system with possible future capabilities, as the Soviet scientists believe, of use against ground-based systems. There is also a way to prevent any arms race in space at all, an over-all approach which entails a permanent ban on the use of force in outer space or from outer space against earth, as well as from earth -- and I would stress that for Dr. Lellouche particularly -- against space objects. No weapon of any kind, whether conventional, nuclear, laser, particle beam or any other, should ever be put into orbit and stationed in outer space, on manned or unmanned systems. No space strike weapons should be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-missile defence or anti-satellite purposes on earth for use against targets on earth or in the air. The already existing weapons of that kind, i.e., those with limited ASAT capabilities which are not fully tested by both sides, should be destroyed.

That is the Soviet over-all approach, which bans the entire family of space strike weapons, but not, of course, early-warning satellites. I would add that there is a step-by-step approach offered by the Soviet Union, which calls for the prohibition, as a first step toward the over-all solution of anti-satellite systems, whether existing or future -- and the X-ray laser is a good example of the latter. There is also the possibility of reaffirming the ABM Treaty, which effectively prohibits the development, testing and deployment of space-based and other kinds of anti-satellite systems. There is also a good approach which was once suggested by France, that is, the immunity of satellites. We can also look into the difference between offensive and defensive systems in space.

So a number of approaches to resolving this problem are possible. But while the scientists on both sides argue about what is possible and what is not, the laboratories and industries are busy.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

RODDICK B. BYERS

I should like to summarize the main points of the paper I submitted for this meeting and to make some further comments on the approach I adopted in the light of the discussion we have had so far.

Let me say that, if we are trying to move toward a co-operative approach to security issues, and a co-operative approach to East-West relations, I would suggest -- and I argue in my paper -- that it's important to reconceptualize our notions of East-West security. I think we need to reconceptualize our thinking as we move towards the year 2000, and that's why I propose in my paper that we start talking more seriously about security regimes. I find it interesting that this hasn't been done in the political and military sphere, particularly since, in the context of the United Nations, we have talked about regimes such as the Law of the Sea regime and the NPT regime. But we haven't really, in any systematic way, addressed the question of security regimes. Consequently, in my paper I have tried to outline the underlying basis for what I think would constitute possible security regimes in the year 2000. I have defined a security regime as a "set of agreed upon principles and norms along with the appropriate rules and decision-making structures to guide the implementation and conduct of security relations." I then attempt to identify the underlying characteristics, in a conceptual sense, of the security regimes. I then, in the second section of the paper, outline the requirements for what I consider a comprehensive East-West security regime, and what would be the ideal form of a security regime for the year 2000. In the third section of the paper I address some of the prospects for security regime change within the framework of the existing political and military environment.

I have identified in the paper three different kinds of security regime. I then go on to argue that what we have at present is an "inferred" security regime, where in essence both East and West, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, have, at least by implication, accepted certain norms and principles for the conduct of East-West security relations. I think it can also be argued that, if one takes the existing steps of discrete arms limitation negotiations which are currently in progress, and if those are brought to successful fruition, what we could then have, in essence, is a "fragmented" security regime, where both East and West, and the United States and the Soviet Union would have explicitly accepted a number of principles and norms which would guide the conduct of their relations. The key, however -- and I think this was made quite clear yesterday by Ambassador Petrovsky -- is whether or not it is possible to upgrade the common interests so as to have complementary and shared security values. That seems to me the essence of the question of whether or not it is possible to have a security regime, and implement it in a way that will not lead to a breakdown on East-West security relations. Unfortunately, at this point in time I don't see that happening. That seems to me to be the key if we want to talk about a common East-West security regime in the year 2000.

The last section of the paper really addresses, I suppose, the question that Timothy Stanley has asked: how do we get there from here? I don't want to anticipate tomorrow's discussion, but it does seem to me that there are a number of fundamental issues that must be addressed. The most important one -- and I suppose in one sense General Batenin's statement this morning raises it indirectly -- is whether or not and to what extent the United States and the Soviet Union are going to pursue unilateral security. In other words, are military-technical developments such that either the United States or the Soviet Union can consider in a serious way pursuing unilateral rather than mutual security. Given the dangers, perceptions and fears of technological breakouts, it seems to me that this can be a distinct possibility, and I think that one can interpret emerging military technologies -- more so, I think, on the side of the United States than the Soviet Union but for both countries -- in conjunction with current military doctrines to illustrate that, to some extent, both superpowers, but again more the United States than the Soviet Union, are interested in unilateral security.

I then say that, if there is not to be a further deterioration of the security relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is, on the political side, up to the Soviet Union at this point in time, to undertake imaginative diplomacy. The situation in Washington is such -- with the Administration so fragmented, and lacking any degree of consensus -- that it seems unable to exercise any degree of political leadership, and it is really up to the Soviet Union, if it wants to try to break the deadlock in Geneva, and this is in my view the key to the current impasse. And this means, for better or for worse, that positions with regard to SDI are going to have to be negotiated with a considerable degree of finesse. I don't know how that can be done, but it seems clear that it will have to be approached very seriously.

Given this situation, I then suggest that one possibility is for the Soviet Union to attempt at the 1986 and 1987 summits -- if they proceed -- to get President Reagan to discuss the principles that should underly a security regime, and if the next summit has the same format as the last one, it will be possible for General Secretary Gorbachev to do that.

There is one other aspect of the situation that I consider very important, and that is the social-psychological context of East-West relations. There has to be a really fundamental change of attitude on the part of both the Soviets and the Americans if we are to move in the direction of a security regime in the year 2000 that is to be based on common security interests and shared security values. What we do know, given post-war history, is that the United States and the Soviet Union can have an implicit, or what I call an inferred security regime and at the same time hold enemy images of each other. What we have to do, I think, is go beyond that. We have to try to move in the direction of a more positive orientation with respect to the socialization of, I suppose, not only political leaders but also military officers, diplomats and, undoubtedly, professors.

(The full text of Dr. Byers' paper has been printed in Disarmament , Vol. IX, No. 2)

JAYANTHA DHANAPALA

Ambassador Dhanapala introduced and summarized the paper he had submitted for the meeting, entitled "Getting There From Here", the full text of which has been published in Disarmament,. Vol. IX, No. 2. In his paper, Ambassador Dhanapala laid stress on the need for a new international security order for the 21st century, and expressed the hope that the meeting would be able to identify main elements of that order and set it as a target for the international community to work towards by consensus. In that context, he supported the establishment of an international verification centre as part of the United Nations system, to which could be added an international satellite monitoring agency, as proposed by France.

EDWARD C. LUCK

Mr. Luck introduced his paper, entitled "Cycles in International Politics: Looking to the Year 2000", the full text of which has been published in Disarmament, Vol. IX, No. 2. In his paper Mr. Luck drew attention to the existence of cycles in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the need to keep current disagreements within the perspective of that cyclical relationship. He concluded that the existence of such cycles need not be cause for pessimism. It was possible, over time, step by step, to create new conditions and to slow or accelerate political cycles, or to moderate their swings, in order to bolster stability.

VLADIMIR PETROVSKI

I think the course of our discussion, like the course of events in the world, has brought us to the point of confronting a very practical question: what is to be done? And it is to this that my own paper is in fact devoted.

I consider that the essence of the approach required at this particular moment is to change the way we think politically and militarily, and to begin to take practical actions which would embody this new mode of political and military thinking. To speak more specifically, I think what is most important, in terms of our military and political thinking, is to introduce a new concept, which would be acceptable to all, and I think the guidelines for this new concept are provided by the idea of common security.

What are the basic elements of this new concept which could be acceptable to all? First of all, it seems to me, we must accept the idea of interdependence. Interdependence has its own system of coordinates, which exist both horizontally and vertically. In other words, interdependence not only concerns the connections between different countries in the world but the interconnections of the different problems with which the international community has to deal.

The second important element of this new thinking is the acceptance of the fact that no state can realistically hope to protect itself with military technology alone, even if that technology is the most powerful and elaborate on earth or in space. We have spoken at length about this technology today, but I think it has only strengthened me in the belief that there can be no reliance any more on the theory of retaliation or the doctrine of deterrence.

What's wrong with these doctrines? Of course, they reflect the real state of affairs, the deterrence which exists in practical reality. But the acceptance of this reality as a kind of political thinking, as a guide to action, will lead us to a dangerous state of affairs, because the officially accepted doctrine of deterrence is actually designed to intensify the arms race and to heighten the risk of nuclear war. And if we follow the path of an arms race it seems to me -- as has already been demonstrated by our military discussion -- we could reach the point where the parity and strategic stability which now serve the purposes of deterrence could cease to be a factor making for such military and political deterrence. One of the most disturbing factors in this development is the Star Wars programme. That is why I think it is necessary not only for the political leaders but for those who deal with military affairs to accept the idea that security, both national and international, are interconnected. We cannot provide national or coalition security at the expense of international security, they are part of the same problem. And the best way to provide this security is the renunciation of war, of any kind of war, both nuclear and conventional, and to stop building the means of destruction. I consider that it is no longer possible to think in terms of either an arms race or nuclear war, and objectively, no one can benefit from either of them politically any longer. That is why the political approach should prevail over other considerations in this particular situation.

So we need to look at security, again, from this new point of view. You konw, in my country we have been thinking about how security can be provided in this situation, and I think a new, and I would even call it revolutionary, element has been introduced into our thinking. We consider tha there should be no desire on any side's part to change the strategic balance in their favour. For example, let us take a hypothetical case. If, for example, we should change the strategic balance in our favour, in favour of the Warsaw Treaty Countries, it would not do us any good, because under present conditions this situation would heighten the suspicions of the United States and add to the instability of the overall situation, That is why it is equally important for everyone to make the adversary feel secure and to maintain one's own security. We do not want to increase our security at the expense of the other side's but we are strongly opposed to any attempt by the other side to increase its security at the expense of ours. This is another important element of politicial thinking.

Political thinking is of course important. As has been rightly said, war begins in the minds of men, and if we begin to change people's thinking, we will create more opportunities for practical action. But actually of course the main problem is such practical action; how to approach the situation in the world today, and to rethink the relationship between all countries, between East and West, North and South, and to begin to create a new system of stable security, or, as Professor Byers put it, a security regime.

Here again, I think a new approach is needed. We cannot treat the problem only in its political and military dimensions any longer. Those dimensions are of course of great importance, but nowadays we should also include among the dimensions of security the economic and humanitarian sphere. The concept of comprehensive international security includes disarmament as one of its integral components, just as it includes the settlement of international crises, the struggle against terrorism and state terrorism, the fight for human rights and the rights of the individual, for the rights of people and for contacts between peoples, and the idea of working toward a positive rather than negative peace. When I speak of positive peace I mean not only the absence of war but absence of the danger of the use of force and the development of broad international co-operation in all fields. We should stop thinking that any sphere is advantageous to the West or advantageous to the East. All spheres are important for the development of international co-operation, and they should all be treated equally.

Another question then arises: how to guarantee the stability of this international security system, or security regime. I consider that in this matter we should rely on our own international experience, on the wealth of thinking that is available in both East and West, both here in Western Europe, and elsewhere -- in India, for example. One of the elements we can draw from this wealth of thinking and experience is the use of direct guarantees of the renunciation of the use of arms and above all nuclear arms, and this renunciation of the use of arms should be the main pillar of the entire edifice of security.

Two questions arise when I discuss these matters with some people. The first is how to connect disarmament with other security guarantees, particularly in the area of conflict resolution. I think it is wrong to make these two questions mutually dependent, just as it is wrong to make the solution of political questions a precondition for disarmament. We sometimes hear, for example, particularly from the American side, let's start dealing with regional conflicts. We are for dealing with regional conflicts, for finding a solution to these conflicts, in co-operation with all the parties concerned. We are not in favour of dealing with them only on a bilateral basis, as between the Soviet Union and the United States alone. That is a superpower approach we do not support.

To sum up, I think that, from the practical point of view, the answer to this question is that we should deal simultaneously with all these questions, and work toward progress simultaneously on disarmament, on regional crises, on terrorism and on all the other problems. What is important is that these efforts should lead to practical results, and that they should not serve as excuses for stopping the efforts in the field of disarmament.

The second question that has often been raised is that of the linkage between disarmament and confidence, or trust. There is a well-known thesis that people do not distrust each other because they are armed but are armed because they distrust each other. One could well agree with that in the context of the interrelation of processes and phenomena in world politics. But this pretext is used by some people to squeeze unprecedented arms appropriations out of legislative bodies and thereby to undermine confidence and trust. In reality, I would say that both assertions are true, and both can be manipulated in any way one chooses. For me, this is a vicious circle. Disarmament and confidence, like disarmament and conflict resolution, are parallel processes. But they cannot be made dependent on each other.

I would add further that in speaking of guarantees for security, I think it is particularly important not only to create legal and political guarantees between states but to create moral or psychological guarantees. We should stop looking at each other through the spectacles of potential enemies. There should be no place in our thinking for ugly Americans or bad Russians. Let's treat each other as neighbours, as human beings. It is very difficult, but we should start thinking of each other in this way, and stop thinking of each other in the military terms of the nineteenth century.

This is the general outline of our approach to the problem of international security. Of course, as I said earlier, although there are many routes to security there are only a few thoroughfares. And I consider disarmament to be the main thoroughfare that leads to common security. In our statement of 15 January we put forward a number of specific proposals, and we put forward a programme of common security through disarmament the central element of which is nuclear disarmament. I would like to stress again that this is not a utopian proposal, it is a pragmatic time-table of clearly defined measures to be implemented in three stages within the foreseeable and historically short period of fifteen years. This is precisely the same period of fifteen years which the other side proposes to use for the development of outer space weapons in order, according to President Reagan, to eliminate nuclear weapons.

But our programme is not intended as a substitute for reaching agreement on specific issues. Its aim is to facilitate the solution of practical matters. It is intended to help forward negotiations in particular areas by placing them in the perspective of overall goals.

What are the issues to be given priority within this programme? I can only express my own point of view. I personally consider that at this moment there are four areas that are ready for practical decisions, and I have discussed them in my paper.

The first of these areas is a test ban, the second is the question of the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone, the third is the complete elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons, and the last is the exploitation of the possibilities which now exist for co-operation in outer space. I have dealt with all of these in my paper, but I should like to add one more word here on the matter of co-operation in outer space. Why should we not draw on the positive experience we have had with IAEA and the NPT regime to start anew to deal with this question? Here I think if we looked soberly at the question we would be able to combine our efforts and to create some sort of international organization, not only for co-operation in outer space but also for international verification of all agreements intended to prevent an arms race in outer space. But let us begin. And let us create far-reaching international projects in this area, using international interplanetary stations, and so on, and this will allay the very proper concern expressed by Dr. Budwine and others about the necessity for developing technologies. This seems to me a practical way to begin to think anew, in the way that Einstein and Bertrand Russell called on us to do many years ago.

How then can this plan for a comprehensive system of international security be realized? In order to realize it, it is necessary to set in motion all the existing international machinery, and here I think we should take a new look at the United Nations. In my view, the United Nations offers many unused potentialities. We have a certain stereotype of the United Nations, and that sometimes leads us to forget to read the Charter. It contains an abundance of opportunities for the peaceful resolution of crises, for the prevention of aggression, and so on, which have not been used at all.

Let us look at those articles of the Charter again. But I am not conservative. I also consider that with the development of international relations and the process of democratization, which will be given a strong impulsion by denuclearization, by eliminating the nuclear club, the United Nations will assume a new role. And this new role will be that the United Nations should serve as a kind of political guarantor of this new common security which is emerging today.

For our part, we have radically changed our practical approach to the United Nations. We understand the financial crisis of the United Nations and we have now made a voluntary contribution of $10 million to alleviate it, and we have begun to contribute to UNIFIL. If there are obligatory decisions concerning further financial contributions we will support them. But again, it is particularly important to set in motion all the negotiating machinery for arms control, arms limitation and disarmament. Because the situation today is paradoxical; this machinery produces no results, whereas the military machinery produces an abundance of results.

We should also keep in mind the special responsibility of the permanent members of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security. They should meet to discuss nuclear disarmament. This is their duty and obligation: they were empowered to do so by the international community, and the international community has every right to demand that they assume their responsibility. We also consider that the bilateral machinery should be utilized to the utmost. Despite all the very unpleasant events that have taken place recently, we are not against a summit meeting. Our only desire is that it should be more than a hand-shaking meeting. This is an important occasion; it should produce results. And if you ask me what results we can expect, I would say that at this particular moment we can expect results with regard to a test ban, and with regard to the prohibition of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

These are the practical actions that can be taken, and this is how we can move forward to the establishment of a comprehensive security system.

ARCHELAUS TURRENTINE

I have a number of comments to make.

First, I would like to address the remark, made by Dr. Rathjens, that US policy is in confusion. One should not confuse the vigorous public debate on important issues with confusion. I can assure you that the private inter-agency debates are just as vigorous in Washington, but of higher quality normally than the public debate. President Reagan has encouraged this. I have served under seven Presidents, and I know of no other who has encouraged more thorough discussion of all aspects of arms control issues. But when the time comes to make a decision, I can assure you that I know of no other President who has been more decisive.

Arms control is of vital importance to the United States. It is a key component of our national security, and a subject that we take very seriously. Genuine arms control or disarmament seeks to limit or eliminate specific weapons by agreement. For such agreements to be truly effective, military planners must be able to conclude with a high probability that the weapons in question are within limits or have been eliminated from a potential opponent's arsenal in peacetime and, if prohibited, will not be introduced in time of war. Additionally, provisions for the verification of compliance should be sufficient to provide adequate warning of breakout so that compensating action can offset any advantages. Anything else would require military planners to hedge their bets in other areas, thus probably offsetting the arms control benefits. One of the fundamentals of military planning is that one cannot assume away the threat; one must deal with reality.

Yesterday I heard it said that it would be better if trust were established between the major powers. The adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is not the product of simple misunderstanding or clashes of personalities. There are real and profound differences between how the West and the East view the world. We differ in our fundamental assumptions about how society should function, to whom governments should be responsible, about state secrecy, justice, religious belief and morality. I merely note these differences and do not pass judgement. While these differences often lead to misunderstanding, and even friction, they are not, and should not be allowed to become, barriers to arms control arrangements that serve the interests of both sides. Better relations, and better understanding between East and West are desirable and should be promoted. Useful co-operative measures can be taken to reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict and misreading of intentions. However, the kind of trust that exists between, for example, the United States and Canada, Italy and France, or Norway and Sweden will not exist between East and West as long as the fundamental differences I mentioned remain. If such trust were to exist, there would be little need for arms control in the East-West context.

I believe that it is worthwhile to reduce US and Soviet weapons substantially. The best way to do this is through a negotiated agreement that permits reductions to occur in a predictable, verifiable fashion. The United States and the Soviet Union seem to be in agreement that the deterrent purposes of strategic forces can be served at a much lower, safer level. For its part, the United States is ready to begin the serious bargaining process. However, there is no prospect for an agreement as long as the Soviet side insists on counting the US medium-range systems worldwide as strategic systems, while excluding over 2000 of their own comparable aircraft and missiles. In addition, the Soviet side continues to link cuts in offensive strategic weapons with a complete ban on SDI. This precondition is clearly unreasonable. In the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations, the previous US proposals remain on the table, and we continue to seek the total global elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet land-based INF missiles.

I have heard nothing new in the various comments regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative. It would not be productive for me to attempt to answer all the criticisms -- some of them fair and some not --since our time is limited and the arguments in favour of SDI are well-known and are a matter of public record. I would note that the remarks that were made today with regard to the prohibition of certain nuclear activities in outer space certainly do apply--specifically, that the prohibitions of the Limited Test-Ban Treaty clearly forbid the testing of nuclear explosives in the atmosphere or in outer space. So any test in this environment would be prohibited. I entirely agree also that the Outer Space Treaty clearly prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. These provisions continue to apply, and I think it is important that we reinforce them.

In the case of the MBFR talks in Vienna, the Western side made a bold move of historic proportions last December, when it dropped its insistence on agreed data on forces prior to the entry into force of an agreement. I hope that in the next MBFR round we will have a move by the Eastern side comparable in scope.

In Stockholm, the CDE negotiations are rapidly approaching a preordained end. The cards are almost all on the table now, and it looks as if a meaningful agreement should be possible.

With regard to work on a chemical weapons ban, this is perhaps the most complex arms control effort that has ever been undertaken. Progress has been painfully slow. A CW ban must be stringent, and, given the nature of the technology, must be intrusive to be effective. We are, after all, trying to craft an agreement that will remove a significant military threat, and ensure that it remains absent. At the same time, we wish to minimize the impact on the very significant peaceful chemical industry which is spread throughout the world.

The United States and the Soviet Union have also agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. I would expect this dialogue to continue.

As we approach the 21st century, it seems likely that arms control, be it de facto or de jure, will help to shape and stabilize the strategic balance, reduce the risk of nuclear and conventional conflict, and, when conventional conflict does occur outside of the East-West context, will mitigate the consequences and collateral effects. I believe that there will not be conventional or nuclear conflict between the East and West in this period as long as the current balance remains. We must be careful, however, not to expect arms control to cure the ills that standard international relations and traditional diplomacy fail to heal. In situations where relative stability exists or can be established by agreement, arms control measures can help to capture and preserve that stability. However, in situations that are inherently unstable, it is unlikely that arms control can produce positive results. It may even make a bad situation worse. The future arms control measures that can contribute most may be smaller steps than the measures we have agreed in the past or are considering today. The great expectations of comprehensive actions must face future realities. I believe that the next generation of arms control efforts are likely to be very specific. We also must ensure that our current agreements are kept attuned to future realities. It is particularly important, I believe, that the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be preserved and kept viable. Hopefully, the highly visible and often public way in which we pursue arms control today will evolve towards a more serious and private approach. Serious bargaining in public is rarely possible. I consider the term public diplomacy to be a contradiction in terms. If it is public it is simply not diplomacy.

BEN SANDERS, Director, Information and Studies Branch, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Mr. Sanders introduced his paper entitled "Non-Proliferation in the year 2000", which argues that, barring unforeseen circumstances the situation with regard to non-proliferation in the year 2000 may be much like the present one. Although there will be a score or more non-nuclear weapon states with the technical capability to make nuclear weapons, states will not easily proceed to a military nuclear stance. The full text of the paper has been published in Disarmament, Vol. IX, No.2.

MIGUEL MARIN BOSCH, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations

I would like to make one comment on Mr. Sanders' paper. There has been an enormous proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1970, on land and on sea. More countries have nuclear weapons on their territory than in 1970. The oceans are more full of nuclear weapons now than in 1970. The nuclear-weapon states, or at least the three depositaries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have spread nuclear weapons all over the globe, and this is an aspect of the matter which I think should be taken into account.

We've been discussing for the last day and a half the impact of weapons development on the strategic balance. I must say, however, that what has been said here reflects a very Eurocentric view of the world. Perhaps that's the nature of this conference, given the nature of the participants. We've also heard remarks concerning the need to find areas of co-operation between East and West in the future. I agree wholeheartedly that we should find those areas in the peaceful uses of outer space, for example, or in international economic development. What really surprised me, however, was the remark that there was a need for East-West co-operation to control the Third World. That's a very nice 19th century concept, but we're approaching the 21st century. The problem, really, for most countries of the world, is how to dissuade the superpowers from intervention in their respective countries. It's been said that deterrence has worked for 40 years, that diplomacy has worked -- but why has diplomacy not worked in the question of Central America, for example? Maybe European postwar security has been based on nuclear deterrence, but it certainly hasn't served the rest of the world.

I agree with those who have stressed the need to discuss the question of the UN. We all agree that the UN is at a crossroads. Its viability as the maker and keeper of international security has been questioned not only by the larger nations but also by the small ones, and I think its current financial crisis, a crisis ostensibly provoked in order to enhance the efforts to streamline the institution, could signify the end of the Organization. Most worrisome is the growing disillusionment in certain US circles, and the United States was of course the UN's principal promoter in 1945. This growing disillusionment in the US, plus the Reagan Administration's outspoken impatience with certain trends within the Organization, might seem to some of us the main cause of the crisis, but I think the explanation is to be found elsewhere. It is to be found in the fact that, from the beginning, both the United States and the Soviet Union undermined the potential role of the United Nations, precisely by forging military alliances and pursuing an arms race which has run counter to the principles and purposes of the Organization. By and large, the superpowers seem to have derived very little benefit from the Organization, except, perhaps as a vehicle for ventilating their differences. In matters of disarmament and security, they have tended to work outside the Organization, and for some they have not only bypassed it but actually trespassed on its functions.

The prevention of a third European-spawned conflagration in this century was, I think, one of the overriding purposes of the United Nations, and while war has been avoided in Europe the superpowers have been involved in many conflicts, some of them rather prolonged, in other parts of the world. Over the past four decades the UN has, however, found some of its most ardent supporters precisely among the European nations, and some of the countries are those to which the superpowers preached and virtually imposed peace in 1945. Now they are not the only ones who defend the UN but, as recent events show, are the ones who urge the world's principal adversaries to act with restraint. Many of these nations are locked in military and security arrangements that often inhibit them from assuming a more constructive attitude towards the United Nations and many international problems on its agenda. They are thus frequently forced to adopt a stance that does not necessarily coincide with their specific interests, and at times pits them against countries with which they have no quarrel at all. As acted out at the United Nations, this becomes a parliamentary pantomime, scarcely resembling reality although producing through the inertia of alliance commitments a false impression of conflict. Genuine international co-operation therefore appears to be precluded within the United Nations framework, and this is a most paradoxical state of affairs, since many UN members share a common vision of a more just world order based on lasting peace and security. These include countries with different levels of economic development, countries with particular regional security concerns and even countries with formal military arangements with one superpower or another. Individually, they struggle to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and it is precisely the threat of a nuclear holocaust -- a threat derived largely from forty years of superpower rivalry -- which could bring them together and eventually move them into collective action to ensure a nuclear weapon-free world and a more peaceful planet. This is precisely the thrust of the New Delhi Declaration subscribed to by the leaders of the states and governments of Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania.

TIMOUR DIMITRICHEV Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs; Secretary, United Nations working group on the concept of deterrence.

Mr. Dimitrichev drew attention to the forthcoming report on the concept of deterrence prepared by a group of experts at the request of the United Nations General Assembly. He noted that the group of experts was made up of representatives of NATO, Warsaw Treaty and non-aligned or neutral countries, and that its conclusions, as presented in the report, were grouped under those three main points of view. With regard to the effect of deterrence on stability, the experts from the NATO countries had concluded that deterrence contributed to stability 'in that it makes aggression extremely unlikely' and enhances crisis stability. The experts from the Warsaw Treaty countries argued that 'stability in the modern age is not caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side, but seeing to it that all should feel equally secure because the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate unpredictability in policy and concrete actions.' The non-aligned countries, for their part, were of the view that 'nuclear deterrence may contribute to a stability of sorts in the industrialized world, but it is a dangerous world subject to the risk of the operation of Murphy's law that 'if something can go wrong it will, at one time or another.' The report has now been published as a United Nations document.

AZIM HUSAIN Principal Advisor, Third World Foundation, London

I wish to comment on the concept of deterrence. The report we have just been told about will, I am sure, be an important one, and will lead to a good deal of discussion throughout the international community.

The concept of deterrence has been under attack in the international community since the beginning of the eighties, particularly since the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. Hence the study we have been told about. In defence of deterrence, it is said that it has maintained peace for the last forty years and would do so into the next century. Forty years of peace cannot be disproved, but neither can the counterclaim that nuclear deterrence was not responsible for keeping the peace. A negative is impossible to prove. The achievement of the last forty years is to have avoided war despite the negative effects and features of the policy of deterrence. Basic to the whole concept of deterrence is the belief in the Soviet threat, a relentless desire for territorial conquest, and the reality of the monolithic communist bloc. The Soviets, it is said, are an expansionist power whose effort is to gain influence and territory. This must be checked at all points in the world, most important of all in Europe, because of the Soviet urge to seize Western Europe. This assessment is based on the postwar events of 1946-1953: Greek civil war; Berlin Blockade; emergence of People's Republic of China; Korean war. But the West does not explain how Soviet interests would be served by the military seizure of Western Europe. The Soviet aim of a communist world revolution under Soviet leadership is a dead letter. They have repeated in recent years that revolution is not for export. The Soviets have never used force against NATO except in the special case of the blockade of Berlin, and since 1971 they respect the position of Berlin for reasons other than nuclear weapons.

I would like to comment now on the concept of deterrence itself as a non-aligned point of view. "Generic deterrence" as a simple concept that applies to most levels of human interaction is unexceptionable. Deterrence in the pre-nuclear world meant that instruments of violence were instruments of policy of sovereign states; this meant, in the words of Clausewitiz, that war was "a continuance of politics by other means"; overcoming the adversary or prevailing upon him, and acceptance of your war aims, and thereafter living after the exhaustion of either side.

The 1945 bomb created an unprecedented problem. Einstein said that to rid the world of nuclear war it would be necessary to establish world government. The realm of politics had to be revolutionized because nuclear weapons had undermined the institution of war. In order to abolish nuclear war, there was need to change the structure of international relations. But at the time neither side wanted an international authority. I'm sure you are all familiar with Brody's work. He said in 1946 that since international authority was not practicable in the foreseeable future, and since nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and we had to live in a nuclear world, the practical thing was to live with the peril on a temporary, time-buying basis, till better arrangements could be devised. But these views of Brodie were soon forgotten and deterrence became a dogma and an end in itself until it came to be questioned in the early eighties.

We all know how the massive retaliation of the fifties was followed by the flexible response of the sixties and seventies and the protracted nuclear war of the eighties, the fearful consequences of which led to SDI of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal for the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The present crucial stage needs some elaboration. There are said to be now 55,000 weapons with a 15,000-megaton yield, equal to one and a quarter million Hiroshimas. These include roughly 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons with a yield of 10,000 megatons. The overall overkill capacity can be judged from the fact that a mere 400 megatons is enough to destroy three-quarters of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity and one-third of its population.

The experts who advocate minimum deterrence give varying estimates, from 200 to 2000, of the number of nuclear weapons which would constitute a certain deterrent. But it is important to note that none plead more than 1000 for each side as enough to eliminate a viable society. Beyond these numbers the debate about numerical equality has no meaning, and equality in different categories of launchers and weapons has even less meaning, because effective deterrence does not depend on matching types of either delivery systems. Sea-based systems can deter land-based systems, ballistic missiles can deter cruise missiles and aircraft can offset cruise missiles.

I come to the conclusion that if agreement on SDI or on the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 is not practical politics--and the view that it is not practical politics was expressed often enough yesterday--then despite the fundamental objectives to deterrence on moral and other grounds, the international community must demand serious discussion of minimum deterrence as a means of making progress towards a more secure world.

Now I would like to make some comments on the non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of Mr. Sanders' paper on the subject. Mr. Sanders' paper only speaks of horizontal non-proliferation, the instruments for which are the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapon-free zones and agreements with the IAEA. Briefly, the view expressed is that fifteen years from now the situation will be the same as now, because there are 134 parties to the NPT and international opinion is against proliferation, as evidenced by the facts that no party to the NPT has withdrawn despite much criticism of the NPT, the number of signatories has steadily increased and the countries suspected of having nuclear weapons--Israel and South Africa--don't own up to it for fear of unfavourable international opinion. No country since 1968, party or non-party to the NPT, has seen fit to claim military nuclear status.

While I entirely agree that international opinion is against proliferation, and the record looks impressive enough, I am not so sanguine about the year 2000. First, the large number of parties to the NPT is of no great significance because 21 are NATO or Warsaw Pact members and about 100 are "never nuclear", who have no capability, ambition or use for nuclear weapons. So there are a dozen genuine promoters of non-proliferation, like Sweden, Mexico and so on. But equally important is the fact that apart from technologically highly advanced countries like the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, the NPT has not been able to attract the dozen or so threshold nuclear powers, or near-nuclears, at whom the Treaty was really aimed, and it is they that constitute the greatest danger for proliferation. Among them I would enumerate Israel, which is believed already to have a nuclear weapon capability--and because of that almost ten Arab countries refuse to accede to the NPT, nor can there be in the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone proposed in the UN in 1974. The efforts of Iraq and Libya are well known. South Africa is believed also to have a nuclear weapon capability, and because of that about ten African countries have refused to accede to the NPT, nor can there be a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa, as proposed by the OAU in 1964. Further, Pakistan is believed to be working towards a nuclear weapon capability and, as has already been mentioned, India has already had an underground test. It would seem from all that has transpired in the last two years, that should Pakistan succeed in what it is attempting to do, India would surely follow suit--as has been made clear by the Prime Minister of India. There is therefore little prospect of South Asia becoming a nuclear weapon-free zone. Then there are Argentina and Brazil, both highly advanced and believed to have nuclear weapons capability. Finally, Taiwan and South Korea were moving in the same direction, but were stopped through the efforts of the United States. All these countries, and a few others, are engaged in regional conflicts or rivalries. The only area to have a nuclear-free zone is Latin America, but Cuba is not a party, Argentina has not ratified, Chile and Brazil have many reservations, and France has not yet ratified Additional Protocol I.

Secondly, China and France have refused to sign the NPT. Whatever their real objections, their declared objections relate to massive vertical proliferation by the superpowers. Their refusal is a serious handicap for the non-proliferation regime.

It seems to me, therefore, that if open or hidden proliferation by the threshold states is not to take place by the year 2000, and nuclear weapon-free zones are to be established, nuclear weapon powers must discharge their obligations under the NPT, and lessen its discriminatory features. It is also important that France and China should sign the NPT, and, finally, that the Soviet Union and the United States should maintain their firm understanding to prevent proliferation in their political, economic and military relations with non-nuclear weapons states.

MILJAN KOMATINA

I want to address the political aspects of strategic stability. It is self-evident that the problem of war and peace is a political choice. However, the technological horizon should not be underestimated or neglected, first, as a factor of autoprogramming of the arms race, and second as a factor which tends to exclude man increasingly from decision-making on war and peace. Continuous efforts must therefore be made to put technology under social and political control.

My main focus is, however, different. When we speak about the political aspects of strategic stability we should not, I think, forget one approach which is not perhaps publicly stated but is sometimes implied. That approach assumes that to achieve political stability one side has to change its political and social system. Of course all systems have to undergo changes, and to adjust themselves to the realities. But the plurality of socio-economic systems is an unavoidable fact of life and will remain a permanent feature of the international community and the strategic environment. This of course does not mean that we will be living because of that fact in eternal conflict or in a permanent casus belli. But the realities are there, and we have to take them into account, that is to deal with strategic stability in a pluralistic world in which we have to 'live together or die together'.

There are other political factors of strategic stability. First of all we have to try to act in favour of the improvement of relations between East and West, but also, and no less, between them and the rest of the world. And this not only through a détente which would mean only the lessening of tension but through co-operation on all levels, political, military, social, humanitarian and others. In other words, we have to go to the root of political conflict.

Second, although disarmament is perhaps the most important problem, there are other global problems which have to be solved co-operatively such as the liberation of countries from foreign occupation and colonial domination and the re-establishment of economic imbalances. The North-South relation is an integral part of the security environment, and it must be treated as such.

Third, I think we must try to have permanently on the agenda what scientists call pre-crisis management or crisis prevention, what UN language defines as the containment of war situations leading to conflicts, and here, of course, regional conflicts are of primary importance.

Fourth, I would say that the change in our conceptual way of thinking that has already been referred to should go beyond avoiding the use of force, important as that is, to finding a way to integrate philosophical convictions or ideologies more fully into the environment of the post-industrial and especially the nuclear world. Of course ideologies will remain a way of interpreting the world, of building one's own way of life, but they should not be a pretext for attempting to make other people happier than they are. If we don't do that we will have a permanent casus belli between different societies and different countries.

Fifth, I think that disarmament is a political problem first of all, that is a problem of political choice, a problem of orientation. Therefore, if we want to change world relations and to demilitarize the environment we have to have that on our agenda not as a technical matter but as a part of foreign and domestic policy with the aim of putting to retirement all driving forces towards an arms race.

In this connection I would like to mention the problem of verification, which, as we all know, is not an abstract problem. Technically, it is a problem linked to disarmament agreements. But there is the political aspect of verification which is in a way autonomous. It will never be possible to develop techniques which will cover all aspects of every eventuality. Therefore, I think that political conditions for verification should be a part of all such endeavours. Call it trust, or confidence transparency or whatever, but what is needed is to avoid taking decisions on war or peace on the basis of speculation or guessing.

Nor do I think it is possible to speak of political stability without taking into account the need to strengthen the United Nations, as the only universal organization, as a means for harmonizing international life, as a sort of nascent world order, and as an instrument for the co-ordination of behaviours. We have a lot to say about the defects of the Organization, but the UN is there, and it is the only universal organization we have at our disposal and without which the world would be more anarchic than it is.

To conclude, I would say that the strategic environment might very well remain militarily stable between now and the year 2000 in the sense that, no one country or group of countries will be able to achieve military superiority over the other. But the political environment will be unstable. Although the military arsenals are concentrated in Europe the confrontations take place elsewhere, and therefore, the Third World will influence the evolution of the whole environment and of East-West relations more than we think. Accordingly the relationship of the developed to the underdeveloped world, of the industrial to the non-industrial world, of the militarily important powers and the militarily weak powers might well occupy a central place in the evolution of the strategic environment. For that reason, I think that the Movement of non-aligned countries should be taken more seriously than is the case. It is neither a trade union, nor a sort of prestige-enhancing gathering, but a new way of looking at international relations, even a new concept of security, and it will increasingly demand a voice in decision-making on global problems. Therefore I think that without co-operation with this Movement there will be no stable world environment.

I think that politically we will really be facing two main challenges: first, how to reconcile necessary social changes in the world which cannot be frozen, even by the nuclear danger with the need to avoid upheavals leading to catastrophic consequences; and second, how to balance the necessity of international security dominated by the centres of military power with the national interests of each of us, that is how to achieve security for all. These are the questions we have to answer, and which we can answer only together.

BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

Let me take as a starting-point Ambassador Marin-Bosch's comment. It is true that we have been discussing strategic stability in the year 2000 almost exclusively in what I would call not a Eurocentric but an East-West framework. That is certainly true, and perhaps it reflects an unchallenged assumption that, first, the East-West conflict will remain even if the content of the adversary and co-operative relationship changes, as it has several times in the recent past, and second, that what will still matter will be the bipolar nuclear relationship between the USA and the USSR. That has been an unspoken axiom of our discussion so far.

I am not sure that that axiom cannot be challenged, but if we accept it, it seems very striking to me that we are discussing arms control with an upside-down set of priorities. If we recognize the centrality of the Soviet-American nuclear relationship, arms control, in spite of the lack of results in the last fifteen years, as far as both sides' arsenals are concerned, should continue to address that issue as a priority. When we are offered intermediate nuclear forces as a priority, as we have been by both Mr. Rathjens and Mr. Petrovsky, we are being offered hors d'oeuvres rather than the main course. I recognize that nuclear reductions by the two superpowers are difficult to achieve, and that the relationship between defence and offense is a major factor. However, to begin with INF seems to me very strange. Intermediate nuclear forces are not that important, even for Europeans. There is no such thing as a European strategic balance. The Soviet Union has rightly said time and again that it is not the place from which a missile is launched, but who owns it and where it lands, that is important. Therefore it doesn't really matter, I think, that you have zero SS-20s, if you retarget for the same destination other missiles which are deemed strategic because they have a longer range. We need to keep in mind the fact that the question of European security is much more complex, and cannot be reduced to artificial divisions. One of the disservices of arms control in the 70s was to sanctify such artificial divisions according to given systems. The trend of technology is to make those categories more and more difficult to contain within a legal and political framework.

The second point I want to address is the question of diffusion of power. What I think Pierre Lellouche was trying to point to in his reference to the Third World is that one of the major elements of the evolution we can foresee to the year 2000 is the diffusion of power, the militarization of the Third World. I do not intend that in an invidious sense. It is just a fact that they have more weapons, and more modern weapons, that they are bigger exporters of weapons now than they were 20 years ago. There is also an emergence of very strong regional powers, both economic, military and political. That is a major change from the world we knew in the 60s, and it will continue. Now this is something that exists outside the East-West relationship, but is not completely foreign to that relationship, and has to be taken into account. Détente was wounded not in Europe but in Ogaden, in Angola and in Afghanistan.

My third point is about the NPT. I am struck by the fact that non-proliferation is always presented as a North-South issue. In fact, proliferation began as an intra-alliance issue. The first case of proliferation was within the Chinese-Soviet alliance; there was the proliferation by France, which was opposed by the United States in the 60s. The NPT was only possible because there was an East-West deal on the multi-lateral forces (MLF), which had nothing to do with the South. That dimension should not be forgotten.

The fourth point is that, whether or not vertical proliferation is to be condemned, it is not by itself that important for the status of the non-proliferation regime. As Mr. Hussain pointed out, it is the regional factor, the feeling of insecurity on the regional level, which is the major factor. When he says that the Indian decision will be determined by the Pakistani decision he is, I think, stating a natural and objective fact, and one that has nothing to do with a 30 percent or a 50 percent cut in the Soviet or the American arsenals. We need to recognize that reality. Conversely, the cases in which non-proliferation was successful earlier were in areas where for various reasons the countries involved were feeling safe. If Sweden or Canada or Australia eschewed a military nuclear option very early on, it was not because arms control had cut down vertical proliferation but because they just do not feel threatened by their neighbors or because they do not consider that the nuclear option will add to their security. So I think we should really be cautious about the vertical-horizontal relationship. In a way, it is a little strange to make something which is functioning and good in itself hostage to something--the reduction of nuclear arsenals--which is good but not to be obtained before a certain time. I think that kind of reverse linkage is not really helpful.

My last point is on the comprehensive test ban issue. CTB has been linked to the non-proliferation issue more for historical than for real, substantial reasons. It is in a way an old icon to which one genuflects. But the relationship is not that obvious. I was struck by General Batenin's comments on the importance of a new generation of nuclear weapons. If those weapons are so important for the future then there will be extraordinarily strong resistance by both the Soviet Union and the USA to abandoning research in that area of nuclear physics. Even if there is an agreement not to develop such weapons, there will, I think, be a strong urge to retain research in order to avoid being surprised. And, after all, tests are nuclear research, they are no longer an ecological problem, and therefore they should be treated like other kinds of research, which add an element of stability to arms control regimes, just as, in bacteriological and chemical warfare, research is considered a prudent hedge to guard against technological surprise.

I have been, deliberately, a little provocative, but it was in order to enliven the discussion.

RODDICK BYERS

Within the last hour and a half I have counted at least twelve different topics that have been raised around this table. Every one of them, in and of itself, is interesting, and I think that many of the observations made are relevant to strategic stability in the year 2000. What I would like to ask is, what is really important with respect to the world we want to be in at the year 2000, as regards strategic stability and mutual security?

Important as many of the issues are that have been raised around this table, I would suggest that they are not first order issues in terms of what we are trying to do within the context of this conference. There are a number of first order issues, and I would suggest that we focus on those. One is the question of deterrence. Where will deterrence be in the year 2000? That I think is the main issue. Related to that, and also a first-order priority, is the question of future military technologies that we discussed earlier. The third first-order issue is the relationship between deterrence and military technologies on the one hand, and questions of arms limitation on the other -- and this is where the UN probably has and could have an essential role. The fourth essential issue we have to address is, what is the political process that will be involved in trying to achieve a more stable world. In other words, how do the two major actors here, the superpowers, interact, and how do the rest of us, who are not directly involved, try to influence the major actors, and what position do we take with respect to their own perspectives on this particular set of issues? So I would suggest that it might be very useful to try to separate out what is really important for the question of strategic stability in the year 2000. No doubt others here will have different ideas about what the first-order priorities are, but I do think we should make an effort to reach some sort of consensus on what they are.

I would also like to comment, while I have the floor, on some of the referrences made here to the concept of deterrence. I think we are doing less than justice to that concept by attacking it as it has been attacked here. There is absolutely no point in trying to blame everything on deterrence qua deterrence. We are not talking about deterrence, in the first instance, because of the Soviet Union; we are talking about it, and we have a problem with it, because of the existence of nuclear weapons. And it is not the concept of deterrence that is the problem, but the way the concept has been operationalized by the United States and the Soviet Union over time. What I find interesting about the Soviet position, as it has evolved, and to some extent the American position, is that they are talking about trying to operationalize deterrence in a way which, in terms of strategic and military doctrine, will eventually mean a minimum deterrent if the arms negotiations are successful. That in turn has a direct bearing on what General Batenin was telling us today about how the political process interacts with military preparations and the arms negotiations process interacts with the process of military planning. We know that the military establishment of both superpowers would like to implement a deterrent strategy based on an effort to gain military superiority and to try to prevail in a nuclear war. That is why I think the question of military doctrine, and whether the United States and the Soviet Union can reach some agreement with respect to security principles is essential, because that will have a direct effect on the number of nuclear weapons and how one tries to operationalize deterrence.

That is the key issue, and I think it does no one any good to continue to atack deterrence, because the only other concept I have heard proposed to replace deterrence -- which is a direct function of the nuclear weapon -- is assured survival, and nobody likes assured survival as President Reagan defines it. So we should be very clear about this, unless someone around this table can tell me what is to replace deterrence. President Reagan gives us a vision of assured survival, but a majority of the people in this room reject it. Now what else is there? Let's be clear about what deterrence is intended to do, and we can certainly object to the way in which it is operationalized, but let's not pretend that it's something that it is not.

MANFRED MUELLER

I think Mr. Byers has raised a decisive question for our discussion -- the question of which are the key subjects on which we can influence the development of the situation as it moves towards the year 2000. I think perhaps we should also start from the other direction in our thinking: can we imagine the world as it will be in the year 2000? I think it will be quite a different world from the one we live in now. Naturally, that depends also on our behaviour and on our policies. On the other hand, there are a lot of processes going on which we have referred to only minimally, global problems like the development process, world population growth and economic processes. But I would agree with Mr. Byers that the decisive problem is the problem of strategies. Since I am myself a member of the United Nations group discussing the deterrence strategy I feel that the problem lies not in the word deterrence but in the substance of the respective strategies. I think we have two basically different kinds of thinking in the strategic field, and that this difference arises out of different visions of how the world will look in the year 2000. If one believes that the old process will continue as it has continued for the last ten or fifteen years then one may feel that the old strategy may also be useful in the future and the old means will also be the means for the future. But if one feels that we are now at a point where something is changing and the world we envisage in the next fifteen years will be a quite different world, then we need to rethink our old strategies and our strategies for the next fifteen years. So I agree with Mr. Byers that a discussion of the strategies and the strategic thinking and the expectation of what can be achieved by our strategies is a decisive element of our discussion.

EDWARD LUCK

I think Dr. Byers has been successful in stimulating some discussion here. I would agree with the proposition that deterrence is clearly not the problem. Deterrence is the only good aspect of nuclear weapons, and therefore I assume that those who suggest that the deterrence concept is a basic evil feel that all nuclear weapons must be eliminated and that deterrence entails the continued existence of a certain minimal number. From any other point of view, however, I really don't understand how deterrence can be regarded as the problem. Deterrence is often used as a rationalization for the possession of weapons acquired for far different reasons, but that is another matter.

However, I would question Dr. Byers' list of priorities for the next fifteen years. I think he has them a bit backwards, and that the discussion yesterday was moving in a different direction. George Rathjens' paper in particular, I thought, suggested that the main problem with arms control and disarmament thinking up to this point was that it focused so much on the numbers of strategic weapons and on deterrence concepts, rather than on the major political problems and other levels of conflict that might actually lead to a nuclear exchange. When we look back fifteen years and think how much the world has changed, particularly in these aspects, and therefore what kind of magnitude of change might we think of over the next fifteen years, what strikes me as troubling is, for example, the tremendous decline in respect for international organizations, and international norms, not only in the United States but in many countries; the growing belief that it's better to go it alone in unilateral strategies in both politics and foreign policy and, in fact, security. That I think is of great concern, because if we see in the next fifteen years as great a decline in respect for international norms, institutions and laws as we have seen in the last fifteen years I don't think we will have anything left.

Secondly, I think that if these trends continue, the problem of terrorism is going to be a major one. This is something that fifteen years ago was not considered a particular problem in most of the world. Now it's become a favourite mode of operations of any number of groups and causes, and it seems to me that because it undermines the basic nature of an international system, is so difficult to control, and leads eventually to conflicts between major powers and Third World powers, it has some very dangerous implications, and it's a very difficult thing for international organizations and international norms to handle, as we have seen in the UN discussions on the subject.

Third, it seems to me that the question of diffusion of military power to the Third World, which was raised by Pierre Lellouche, has become increasingly important over the last fifteen years. It was in the early seventies that there was a massive increase in arms transfers to the Third World, particularly to the Persian Gulf -- and we are now seeing some of those arms being used in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- and to the Middle East, and it has in fact made a major difference in international conflict. I was glad that Ambassador Marin-Bosch raised that subject because while the greatest concentration of arms may in fact be in Central Europe, that is also the area of greatest stability. It has also been the area of greatest attention in arms control and in thinking in these ways, and therefore has a certain sense of stability about it. The problems that worry me are not the problems that everyone is talking and thinking about but the ones that people are not paying attention to, and it seems to me that's a very good reason not to focus so much on deterrence and outer space and strategic weapons alone -- important as they are and as much as they have to be worked on -- because those are not the problems that are going to sneak up and surprise us. One thing that always surprises me is how little people are able to predict the future, and how much we focus on things that are in vogue while the things that actually happen to disturb relationships are the things we haven't predicted at all.

I would note that there is an increasing tendency for major powers to get involved in conflicts in the Third World with Third World states. Three obvious examples are Afghanistan, Nicaragua and the Falklands-Malvinas. I don't think that's a trend that's going to disappear: it's one that 's related both to the question of terrorism and the question of the diffusion of military power, to the Third World. That raises questions about the importance of addressing conventional arms control, conventional arms transfers and other matters.

In terms of the strategic relationship and what's happened over the last fifteen years, I don't think that anything fundamental has happened to deterrence. There are certain trends that bring into question the way we think about it -- the question of MIRVs is one, the question of moving towards mobility, with the problems that raises for verification -- but the basic arguments and the basic discussions today are not much different from those of the late 1960s and early 1970s. I was initiated into this field during the ABM debate, and the basic concepts we discussed in the late 60s, leading up to the ABM Treaty, are really very similar to those we discussed today. The basic questions of the relationship between offense and defence and of which are more stabilizing or destabilizing are the same. So it seems to me that while it's important to keep addressing these things, if they are still the focus of our attention fifteen years from now, as they were fifteen years ago, we will have missed the boat.

VLADIMIR PETROVSKY

Professor Byers has, I think, raised the really important question: what has to be done before the year 2000. Of course the fourteen years that are left before the year 2000 are a very short period of time from the historical point of view. But from the viewpoint of practical politics I think it's quite a long period, a period during which the rather substantial actions could be undertaken which could not only change the reality but answer the question Professor Byers has posed; what kind of security regime should we have by the year 2000. This is the crux of the matter, and I think we should approach this question first of all from a new conceptual standpoint, the approach that Olaf Palme called that of common security, an approach that excludes reliance on the military solution of questions and gives priority to the political solution.

From this point of view it seems to me that deterrence is a page in our history that has been turned. It is a stereotype of the old age. In the new age we are trying to build, and into which we are trying to see, the security regime should be based not on deterrence but on security guarantees. These could be of different natures, and I think it is a good exercise, and not only an intellectual but a practical exercise, to think about what kind of security guarantees could be worked out in order to rule out the use of force by the year 2000. Of course I am not so idealistic as to think that we will be able to do away with all kinds of weapons. But I consider that by the year 2000 we still have the opportunity to do away with nuclear weapons. We have the opportunity to begin a new era with the year 2000, an era free of nuclear weapons. And from that time on I think strategic stability should be maintained without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. It should rather be maintained at a very reduced level of military balance which would be characterized by a reasonable level of sufficiency. And this level could be progressively lowered, so that in the long run this level of sufficiency should be replaced by the political, legal, material and other guarantees, including moral and psychological guarantees which demand the creation of a psychology of peace. In other words, the stability achieved in this way should be supported by realizing the conception of positive peace about which Dr. Prawitz has spoken.

But what is most important at this particular moment is to begin taking practical action. The conditions for this exist. And we on our side are not proposing only a list of hors d'oeuvres. We are ready to start at any level if the West is ready. If the West is ready, we are ready to start immediately with radical nuclear disarmament. If not, we are ready to start with short-range or very specific measures. But actions are badly needed. What is needed is to make a start, on arms control or in other areas -- but remembering that the main highway to a security system is action on arms control. Discussions of doctrine are useful theoretically, but from a practical point of view they lead us away from practical actions, from the possibility of using the remaining time to create a new system, a new regime of security.

The moment is very serious. There can be discussion, and problems arise all the time. But the problems will remain problems until we really begin to negotiate and to try to achieve results. I remember, in Dickens' Pickwick Papers, when a difficult situation arose, Mr. Pickwick liked to say, "Let's make an effort." I say to all of you, let's make an effort. Let's make a beginning. Then we will have a good security regime -- and I fully agree with Dr. Byers that we need a security system. But we should approach that security system with a new way of thinking.

GEOFFREY PEARSON

We have talked about priorities, and about the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Well, the Final Document set out a whole list of priorities. Paragraph 47, for example, set out the priorities on disarmament. It said that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, and that the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. So, while words can hide a great deal, I think the priorities on disarmament were fairly clear, and have remained fairly clear.

But once we have agreed that nuclear weapons have the highest priority, a number of other questions follow. Is it a condition for the success of nuclear arms reductions that we reduce conventional arms greatly? And if the goal is the elimination of nuclear weapons, how can we be sure that will actually take place? What means of verification will there be? Or is there something to be said for minimum deterrence? And what is the relationship between nuclear disarmament and the spread of nuclear weapons to other states?

All these questions, I think, are going to be much the same in the year 2000 as they are now. They remain serious and difficult questions which go to the heart of the security of all states. I hope that we can make progress step by step, but I don't think that we can simply brush these questions aside and hope that by the year 2000 these problems will have changed.

Related to them is the question of what sort of international authority will remain to enforce these agreements, if we succeed in making them. I agree with Mr. Petrovsky that we have to think seriously about the United Nations--but that was not always the major concern of the Soviet Union. One of our serious difficulties in the UN was always to try to get the Soviet Union to agree to any kind of international regime involving the United Nations. Look what happened to every peacekeeping effort we tried to set up. It was the Soviet Union and its allies which either refused to pay or objected in principle--

VLADIMIR PETROVSKY

Now we have a new way of thinking. New thinking for the nuclear age.

GEOFFREY PEARSON

Well, I'm prepared to believe that you have changed. That is a very important fact, that the new leaderhsip in the Soviet Union, and new conditions in the world mean that there is a better chance to make the UN work. Now, on the other hand, the United States is moving in the opposite direction. One of the great difficulties for the small and medium-sized powers is that we can never get the United States and the Soviet Union into any sort of alignment. They're always going in different directions.

But I think perhaps there is more hope now that by the year 2000 there will be a better chance to get agreement on the original functions of the United Nations, which, after all -- as you said, Mr. Petrovsky -- were set out and agreed a long time ago. And it's important that we come to some kind of consensus by the year 2000 about what's going to take the place of deterrence, or the balance of power or whatever we choose to call it.

My final point is on the question of the relationship between disarmament and the settlement of regional disputes. I undertand what the Soviet Union is saying about how one should not be linked to the other. On the other hand, there is very clear perception in my country, and I think elsewhere, that it's very difficult to pursue the process of disarmament very far unless there is some greater confidence between East and West and North and South, and it's very hard to build that confidence unless there is some better basis for settling regional disputes.

So these questions are inevitably linked, and that must necessarily lead us back to strengthening the United Nations as an instrument for settling these regional conflicts, and to strengthening the role of the Secretary-General so that he can act as an impartial mediator. The great powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, will simply have to accept, in the end, that the rest of us, through the Secretary-General, have a say in how these disputes are to be settled.

ARCHELAUS TURRENTINE

I think first that the ongoing negotations are at a very opportune point. There are a number of instances where significant progress can be made, and I would stress that we should avoid arbitrary linkages that simply do not make sense. However, I believe there is a relationship between the negotiations, in the larger sense. In that sense, as someone pointed out here earlier, to rid the world of nuclear weapons and not of chemical weapons would indeed be a dangerous thing. By the same token, to talk of eliminating nuclear weapons and not talk of conventional balance also simply doesn't make sense.

While we are looking ahead, and thinking about the negotiations now going on, we should not forget the agreements that have already been concluded, and the necessity to ensure compliance with them. In this regard, it is important that compliance concerns should be addressed seriously and in goodwill, and that we should seek to resolve these concerns. I think there is a role the UN can play in this respect. We know what happenend in the case of the concerns about chemical weapon use in the Iran-Iraq conflict. There are other instances where compliance concerns have been raised and have not been successfully resolved. I would only suggest that in looking at the role the UN can play we should not forget the role it can and should play in the area of compliance.

FABIO MIGLIORINI

It has been said, rightly I believe, that the way to stability is through a new security regime. In the same vein, Ambassador Petrovsky has pointed out that a new common security approach is the possible answer to the challenges of the future, and to the general aspirations for stability. I would like to point out that in the period of détente we saw a first attempt at a co-operative approach to the problems connected with the strengthening of international stability and security. It was not a totally successful attempt, for many reasons. Excessive expectations were one reason. But another very important cause was that détente was interpreted in very different ways by interested parties, and was founded on a doubtful and ambiguous basis.

As Mr. Luck pointed out, the pendulum may now be moving towards new improvement of East-West relations. This is therefore the right time for an in-depth reflection. A co-operative approach or a new security regime must take into account a complex of elements and not only those concerning the strategic balance. It has been said that all spheres are important. It is true that we should not be too rigid in trying to establish an interdependence, but in the long run a co-operative approach must also embody a respect for a certain code of conduct, in self-restraint, in the willingness to accept an equal level of security for the counterpart, in the limitation of ambitions and the transparency of intentions. The strengthening of mutual confidence is necessary, and effective verification is therefore of the essence.

ROLF HOFSTETTER

If anything is clear in my mind about the year 2000, it is that there will still be weapons then, most probably including nuclear weapons. Now if weapons still exist in the year 2000, it will be necessary to maintain a balance of those weapons between the East and the West. What we could aim at realistically is that this balance should be at a lower level.

Why do we want to have this balance? Because we will only feel secure if a stable balance exists. We want it, so to speak, for deterrent purposes. We quarrel about the word deterrence, but what it comes down to is balance and stability, and I myself would be satisfied to speak in those terms. We should not inflate the concept of deterrence into something like a striving for superiority. They are not identical, and deterrence does not have to mean that.

We want a lower level of forces, and we want more co-operation. Now, the question is how to get there. I found Mr. Byers' paper very interesting, and perhaps we haven't discussed it enough. He has mentioned, for instance, the question of agreement on fundamental security principles. This agreement partly exists. But it could be enlarged. If there is another summit meeting, perhaps we will have an agreement on a few more principles, and then they can be expanded. These are words, but agreement on principles is something that has a political significance.

That is perhaps not enough, and Mr. Petrovsky stressed deeds. Well, who is against deeds? I am also in favour of deeds, because without deeds we won't reach a lower level of forces. But there is a problem with these deeds if one talks about arms control. Somebody makes a proposal and the other party says, no, that's not exactly what I had thought it should be. Now the first party can say, well, he didn't respond with deeds because he didn't accept my proposal. That is a little too easy. Deeds cannot consist in just saying yes to what the other side proposes. By deeds I would mean, in arms control terms, a serious process of negotiations, a process in which each side is prepared to discuss all proposals, its own and those of the other side, at the conference table, and in which a readiness for compromise is shown. And I think we have reached a stage, in CDE and MBFR, the bilateral American-Soviet negotiations, the CD negotiations on chemical weapons, where the proposals are on the table, and where the time has come for the real negotiating process. I was very happy to hear again that verification, which for a long time seemed to be a problem, is perhaps, at least in principle, no problem any longer. Now, of course, we are not here, to reach an agreement on the verification regime;

that is for the negotiators. But I would like to make one point on this subject. It has been implied that verification is something that has been invented by some people in order to make arms control impossible. So it is said that the West demands 30 inspections for MBFR. But the 30 inspections are not only a demand on the other side, they are also an offer. We are prepared to accept 30 inspections. For the West too, or at least for my own country, verification is not such a pleasant thing. But we think it is necessary. So we offer it, and we hope that the other side will make the same offer. That should help us to reach an agreement. So I am somewhat hopeful that this important question will now really be dealt with, and if we achieve that we will have taken the first step on the road to strategic stability.

MANFRED MUELLER

I would like to say only a few words about why I dislike deterrence. Deterrence needs enemies. It requires an enemy whom we have to deter. And this in itself creates the arms race. The others who are named potential aggressors must feel endangered, even if they are not potential aggressors. So, even in this very basic way, deterrence is not a viable concept in the present situation. It prevents us from shifting the problems from the military to the political level. And this applies also to the question of security guarantees. The guarantees for security cannot in the first instance be military guarantees, they must be political guarantees. Naturally, as long as we have weapon systems we need military guarantees too, and the best guarantee is agreed equilibrium. But it must be agreed. Otherwise equilibrium is only an argument, not a workable concept. And we had that agreed equilibrium in SALT I and SALT II. So it is possible to achieve agreed equilibrium. But the main problem is that we must free ourselves from this purely military thinking. It forces us into a certain mold of thought, and it has as its consequence that we see the other side only as a potential enemy. And this is the beginning of the end for us. We can solve the problem only if we regard the other side as a partner in the game, not an adversary.

GETTING THERE FROM HERE

ALESSANDRO CORRADINI

Dr. Corradini introduced his paper "Mutual Security In a Global Context", which calls on governments to recognize that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the United Nations Charter and the speedy, substantial and progressive reduction of arms and armed forces. The full text of the paper has been published in Disarmament, Vol IX, No. 2

MILJAN KOMATINA

Mr. Komatina introduced his paper, entitled "Implications for the United Nations", which argued that the concept of strategic stability and mutual security differs from the United Nations approach, which is incompatible with any classical or modern balance of force theories as a permanent peacekeeping strategy. As the United Nations goal is collective security through general and complete disarmament, arms control, arms reduction, strategic stability, parity and other such notions should be viewed only as intermediate stages towards disarmament and not as substitutes for it. The full text of the paper has been published in Disarmament, Vol. IX, No. 2.

TIMOTHY STANLEY

Anyone with the unenviable position of "final speaker" has two choices: to simply say that he agrees (or disagrees) with all previous speakers and sit down, or to seek to provide what is called in fireworks displays a "grand finale". I will not do the former because I both agree and disagree with a number of prior comments; and I lack the ability to do the latter.

So I will merely highlight the themes of my conference paper which you have before you. It was originally intended to be an introduction to this conference; whether it can instead be turned into a conclusion is more problematic.

But its "bottom line" is that East and West, North and South, and the first, second and the third worlds, indeed all humanity, tend to act on the "zero sum" game approach; that is, my loss is your gain and vice versa. That has certainly been true in arms control. What is needed in any blueprint for "strategic stability and mutual security in the year 2000" is a positive-sum game approach, where all actors stand to gain from a concept of "equal security". It is encouraging to find this approach, at least at the declaratory level, in recent Soviet proposals and in Ambassador Petrovsky's paper yesterday, and in the remarks of several other participants.

However, I should also comment on the role of the smaller neutral and nonaligned countries as well as the allies of the two superpowers, which has often surfaced in our discussions here over these three days. Economists have a cliché which appears apt: superpower accords on their arms race are " a necessary but not a sufficient condition" for world security. That is, they are a sine qua non; but the larger world represented by the UN has a role not only in holding the US and Soviet "feet to the fire" of world opinion to get on with their own part of the job, but also in developing other broader and multilateral accords on a regional and functional basis, as outlined by our Swedish colleague.

Reality also requires us to consider the many practical obstacles, even to this "necessary" condition. Some of them were already suggested this morning. While I am in no way disputing the needs for civilized political conduct, respected UN accords, and mutual trust, these will take time to develop on an East-West basis. And our time may be running out. So we must deal with the nuclear and non-nuclear deterrents and their related weapons systems as they are, not as we wish they were, in order to get to where Dr. Corradini wants to go.

In recent months, the West has received from Moscow what seems, to a former artillery man, a "rolling barrage" of proposals, counterproposals, and hints. It is hard to tell what is serious, what is a promising overture, and what is merely "public relations", not to say propaganda. As one example, few at this conference appear to believe that Mr. Gorbachev's call for a denuclearized world in 2000 is feasible or even desirable. Last night I was talking with some of the scientists at the astronomy conference going on here in Erice simultaneously with ours. We agreed that between our two groups alone there was enough knowledge in this building this week to rebuild a nuclear weapon, even if all stocks had been magically destroyed. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle and cannot be rebottled; and in a denuclearized world, a terrorist with a bomb could be king!

My paper proposes a thesis, or perhaps hypothesis is a better word, on how some current impasses might be "leapfrogged", as outlined on page one.

Basically, this involves three elements:

(1) assuming certain outcomes on the hypothetical basis that there will be a supporting "foundation", one can go on to draw an also hypothetical blueprint for the other floors. Once they are drawn, then the foundation's blueprint may seem even more feasible. For example, the East now agrees to "verification" in principle, but in practice usually does so only in the context of a specific accord which it sees as in its own interests. But the West will only discuss such accords if they can be verified -- which is a classical chicken-and-egg dilemma and hence an arms control impasse;

(2) second, we need to look backward at the present from the vantage point of 2000 and develop concepts of what Professor Byers' paper calls "security regimes" and to do so by 2000, we must start now; and third,

(3) we need to find joint mechanisms to work toward such regimes which will treat both arms developments and arms control measures in parallel. This

is easier said than done, for bureaucracies in both East and West are used to thinking of the other as "the enemy". It is almost revolutionary for them to consider each other as potential allies in a common search for equal and stable security. My paper recognizes the enormous vested interests created by the fact of spending $75 trillion by the world on armaments in just two decades. All kinds of constituencies in government and industry and academia seek to hold their market shares of the relevant GNP "pie." Yet a countervailing force is the tightening of what I call the economic hypotenuse on the threat perception-military response triangle, i.e., economic resource and budgetary constraints on both superpowers, for example in the US Gramm-Rudman law. This hypotenuse can also be measured as opportunity costs or lost opportunities, including foreign assistance, from unnecessary defense expenditures.

My paper also attempted to outline three arms control alternative scenarios for 2000 and beyond, namely, the best, worst and middle (or most likely), all in quotes of course.

I have excluded both the ideal utopian world of international peace, harmony and denuclearization, and equally the disaster scenario of a major East-West military conflict. Within those limits, the "best" is a comprehensive world regime of arms control and reductions involving: (a) central strategic and space systems; (b) intermediate nuclear systems; (c) the balance (or imbalance, as the West sees it) of conventional forces in Europe, including the new technologies; (d) overall military expenditure limitations; and (e) functional areas, chemical weapons, ASATs, nuclear testing, etc., as well as regional security arrangements.

Even that "best" seems utopian from where we are now. But the worst case, short of war, means no regime, no bilateral or multilateral arms constraints, and continued quantitative and qualitative escalation of arms races, limited only by economic resources and the people's willingness to pay the bills.

My paper argues that this "worst" scenario is unstable, as each side will see itself behind in one or another "gap", vulnerable to crisis mismanagement, and wasteful through inefficient allocation of economic resources. And it is surely not in the world's interest.

One must then seek a "middle case" which will be some improvement on the status quo, with some reliable arms control regimes, even though other areas are still unconstrained as rivalries continue and as weapons designers seek to mitigate the implications of stalemate, in hopes that well before 2000 we'll be moving toward the best rather than regressing toward the worst case.

The paper concludes with some orthodox suggestions for diplomacy -- and an unorthodox one of a quasi-official commission, possibly under UN auspicies, composed of uninstructed experts to make joint assessment of arms/arms control futures but not to negotiate, bargain, or make propaganda about them.

That idea stems from my government experience with "political-military gaming" (as contrasted with traditional war-gaming) in which players are taught to see the overall situation through their opponent's eyes. For example, the commission, with selected East-West and a few neutral members, could run an arms control game in which it is assumed that central strategic systems have been stabilized by whatever mix of deep cuts and/or limited strategic defense systems. Then what can be done about INF, MBFR, etc.?

Once overall, or even alternative, hypothetical blueprints for strategic stability and mutual security in the year 2000 had been presented to governments on a confidental basis, it is then up to those governments to negotiate those blueprints that they can agree with into stable structures for peace.

Maybe such a scheme is too academic and hypothetical for the tough real world of domestic and international politics. But that can only be known if there is a willingness to give it a try. If this conference sends us all home with some new ideas to feed into our respective circuits, whether this one or some of the others we have heard over these three days, then it will have accomplished its purpose.

AZIM HUSAIN, Principal Advisor, Third World Foundation, London

I wish to speak very briefly about world public opinion, the peace movements and the question of security in the year 2000.

While detente lasted, in the sixties and seventies, faith in deterrence was unquestionned. But with its fall, and the resumption of the cold war, emerged the fear of nuclear war because of the deterrence doctrines which envisaged nuclear war fighting and prevailing in a protracted nuclear war. The freeze and peace movements became mass movements in the eighties.

While the peace movements in Europe and North America may sometimes talk quite unrealistically, they do raise certain basic issues relating to negotiations to which references have been made by several people here. They alone ask, what is it all about? They are not reviving the controversy of the early fifties between Einstein and Brodie about world government; they are referring to the handling of the relations between the two alliances. Shouldn't political dëtente precede disarmament? If the superpowers are to rid themselves of half of their weapons, should they first rid themselves of half of their political differences? Is the aim the stability of existing arsenals or deep reductions down to minimum deterrence and finally elimination altogether? Is ballistic missile defense intended to abolish nuclear weapons or a hedge against cheating, or is it to ensure strategic superiority and a first strike capability? Is the aim of negotiations to maintain the edge you happen to have while undermining the momentum of the anti-nuclear freeze and peace movements? Is the arms race, including SDI, to be an undeclared war of economic attrition against the Soviet Union? These are some of the questions asked by the peace movements.

It is possible, in a very broad and general way, to measure the change in public opinion. For example, in 1965 the second Vatican council said that the use of nuclear weapons was justified in a war of legitimate self-defence, except that nuclear weapons should be used discriminately. We all know now that in 1983 the US Catholic bishops' pastoral letter condemned nuclear war and could find no situation in which the first use of nuclear weapons would be justified. In 1985 the Washington Post and ABC television survey found 74 percent of the public in favour of the reduction of nuclear weapons and against SDI.

Public opinion in the United States has had some effect on the Administration's postures and policies. The START negotiations were proposed in May 1982. The Scowcroft Commission was appointed in January 1983 because of public opposition to the MX missile and lack of progress in arms control. Europe received 108 Pershing II and 464 cruise missiles rather than the 2,000 originally envisaged for the same reasons. Despite the Pentagon's report on SALT II violations the Administration has found it difficult to break out of SALT II and the ABM Treaty. The Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and the statement that "we do not seek nuclear superiority, we do not seek a first-strike advantage over the Soviet Union" may be merely declaratory statements, but have been welcomed as a response to public concern and anxieties not only in North America and Europe but throughout the world. Likewise the Administration cannot afford, because of public opinion, to abandon or postpone the next summit meeting due in 1986.

The strength of the peace movement varies from country to country, and so also does the responsiveness of governments to public opinion generated by the peace movements. To give a few examples: we all know of the banning of nuclear-armed warships by New Zealand. Also, under the pressure of aroused public opinion, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji have sued France in the World Court to protest against the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. These sentiments have led in 1985 to agreement on South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone among the countries of the region. Public opposition to Star Wars has led Scandinavian countries, some other European countries, Australia and Canada to decline to participate in SDI research. Public opinion has also been responsible for the refusal of certain countries within the two alliances to accept nuclear weapons in peacetime.

These are mere straws in the wind, and seem of little consequence to the grave issues of government policies on arms control, disarmament and security that we have been discussing. But let us be aware that dedicated peace movements are growing, not diminishing in strength, and must ultimately exercise strong influence on democratic governments in favour of disarmament by the year 2000, regardless of the doctrine of deterrence and the industrial-military complexes of the two alliances.

G. O. OLUSANYA

I would like to begin by taking my cue from what Dr. Byers has been saying for the past two days, and asking, what is our vision of society in the year 2000? I think this is very important. But that vision must be based on reality. Now, what will happen in the future depends in large part on the present. Moreover, if we take our cue from history, we can safely say, I think, that certain things will continue to exist in the future. For example, there is no doubt that weapons will continue to exist. There is no doubt that military balance, deterrence, and so on, will also remain as a concept and continue to be practiced. But I think the basic issue in trying to establish our vision of the future is to decide what kind of weapons we want to continue to exist, if we really want civilization to continue. Is it the kind of weapon that will destroy mankind? I believe the answer to that question from all of us here, or from anyone, would certainly be no. Armaments themselves do not provide security, in fact they tend to enhance insecurity, and therefore continuing to accumulate armaments provides no security. The same is true of any continuing reliance on deterrence. Consequently, I think we must begin to take very seriously the process of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

First of all, I think we must have a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. Second, we should halt attempts at the militarization of space. After that we should begin a process of total elimination of nuclear weapons by gradual reductions -- because I do not think we can leapfrog here -- and this must be tied to reductions in conventional arms and prohibition of chemical warfare. In order to achieve these steps, the issue of verification becomes crucial. Now that it seems to have been agreed by the two superpowers that it is possible to achieve verification, we should begin to address ourselves seriously to this issue.

I think also that the UN has a vital role to play in the effort to achieve all this.

For the past two days we have talked about co-operation and about political will. What is really the problem? The fact is that we have two competing and conflicting systems, and this competition and conflict takes place throughout the whole world. From a Third World perspective, I would say that this conflict and competition has even increased in intensity. There is therefore a need for some kind of code of conduct on the part of the two superpowers, at least in their attempts to sell their own social systems. What this means is that they must guarantee every nation the right to develop its own social system without being threatened by military forces or economic and other pressures. If we can manage to achieve this code of conduct we can move back to the kind of reduction of tensions we have achieved in the past. Looked at from a Third World perspective, we also find that the definition of national interest is being stretched almost to a ridiculous extreme. In order to establish the necessary basis for co-operation this too must come within the compass of a code of conduct accepted by the two superpowers. And here too, seen from a Third World perspective, the UN has a vital role to play.

ARCHELAUS TURRENTINE

I think it's important that we keep the worthy objectives and ideals that Dr. Corradini mentioned in his statement in mind. It's fundamental that we should have a vision of a better world. How we get there is one of the things we are examining today.

I also believe that there is a question of reality, of where we are today. We have heard much about morality, and the deterrent, and we have heard people suggest that it is a flawed concept. But I have not heard anyone suggest what I would call a viable alternative. I have none to suggest myself.

One suggestion that Dr. Stanley made I think deserves some very serious attention, the notion of having games between the major powers to look at some of the issues and see if we can get a better understanding of each other's thinking. That seems to me a very worthy idea, and I hope that perhaps we can take that back to our capitals and think about it. It would seem that in order to work effectively these games would have to be in some sort of private setting such as this.

I would like to make some further comments on the chemical weapons issue. So far as the negotiations are concerned, it should be clear that we're not talking about a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in this area. Perhaps that is the most important element in this negotiation, but there are also fifteen or sixteen other countries that actually possess chemical weapons at this time, and the lessons that are being learned at this time are not good lessons. There is a war going on at this moment, and chemical weapons are being used in that war. The United Nations has taken note of this, and yet the weapons continue to be used. What must be done now is to try to stop the use of such weapons, to reinforce the international norm that has been established against such use, and I think that we all should work toward promoting that objective.

FABIO MIGLIORINI

As I said earlier, stability has many dimensions, including the military, the political and the psychological. The political element, however, is, in my view, the dominant one, because it can also provide the key to the other dimensions. Through negotiation and dialogue, the increase of mutual trust, through the gradual adoption of concrete measures, the military and the psychological dimensions can also be dealt with in a constructive way. In the military field, a balance at lower levels can be established, and here is the value of arms control. I would say that deterrence still has a vital role to play until the conditions that made it necessary fade away. But, through a co-operative approach, it can be stabilized at a lower level of forces through a proper mixture of offensive and defensive, nuclear and conventional forces. Through a political approach, other aspects can be approached concerning respect for a code of conduct and behaviour among nations in the many fields of their activities. A greater transparency of intentions, including a greater transparency of military budgets, can also help towards an improvement in the psychological dimension.

GEOFFREY PEARSON

As we near the conclusion of this meeting, I want to sum up some of my own reactions to it. It's not easy for diplomats to talk about fifteen years from today, we concentrate on the here and now, and, as we've seen during this meeting, at least half our conversation has been about what to do today and tomorrow. It's somewhat easier for academics to speculate about the future, and I think some of the papers presented by our academic colleagues -- I might mention Dr. Rathjens and Rod Byers in particular -- have pointed to the conditions we need to achieve if we are to reach the year 2000 more or less in the same kind of condition we are in now.

My own expectation is that the world in the year 2000 will continue to be more like it is now than different from what it is now. I expect it will continue to be dominated by the two great powers, that they and the rest of us will continue to live in a world in which we are vulnerable to the use of nuclear weapons, and I'm glad Mr. Husain pointed to the fears of the public about that kind of world. I agree with him that those fears are not going to disappear, that the peace movements representing these public fears will continue to be active, and quite naturally so. One of the things we haven't discussed here is the possibility of accidental war. For the average person in my country, and I'm sure in most countries, that is the nightmare. I don't think many people expect the Soviet Union to attack the United States, or the United States to attack the Soviet Union. I do think many people fear that there will be some kind of accident, either an accident in the mechanical sense or an accident in the sense of political inadvertence, that we will be drawn into conflicts. And I don't think our governments, including mine, have really done very much to deal with that fear.

I would put as a minimum objective for the year 2000 to be able to give relative confidence to people that that is not going to happen. If we can do that then I think we've achieved a great deal.

I think George Rathjens was right, at the very beginning of this meeting, to point to the political problems in the rest of the world, not really so much in Europe or in the East-West context, that could lead to confrontation between the two great powers. I would therefore put as another minimum but most important and vital objective that we try to achieve means of having confidence -- confidence-building measures, if you like -- to reduce that possibility of war to a minimum.

I think some of the recent proposals of the Soviet Union, including those of January 15th, have been positive. I personally welcome them. It was almost inconceivable five years ago, when I went to Moscow, that such proposals would have been made in such a short time. I do think there has been a change in the East-West climate, to some extent, and that Mr. Gorbachev is attempting to bring about real progress. That doesn't mean that I think the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons is attainable by the year 2000. But I don't think that's quite the point. The point is that it is a sign of confidence that at least the two great powers are talking about ridding the world of nuclear weapons. President Reagan is talking the same way as Mr. Gorbachev. Of course, he has a different approach. Nevertheless, I think that is hopeful.

But I don't think we are going to live in a very different world. I think it will continue to exist in a condition of vulnerability based on mutual rivalry, that we will be dominated still by the offense and not by the defence, that we will have to live with that and do our best as government officials or as individuals to bring about the minimum state of confidence which will lead to at least the hope that into the next century, we can begin the process of disarmament to the point where these weapons are not the threat that they seem to be at the moment. That is perhaps a modest hope, but if out of this meeting we can put forward some ideas about how to achieve it--and a number have been suggested here--we will have accomplished something.

I do think that we have to give attention to the role of international law and international institutions at the same time that we give attention to means for arms control. I think that is where countries like Canada and Italy and Germany and so on can make a real contribution to finding a middle way, as middle powers, to bring about better means of verification, better means of control, through the UN. I think that my country will continue to try to do that, and that therefore into the next century, with a little luck -- we're going to need some luck -- we can continue to improve the conditions which will lead to greater hope for disarmament during the next century.

The other phenomenon that we haven't discussed here, and should have perhaps, is the whole problem of low-level conflict. If the ordinary human being fears nuclear war, he also fears he's going to be blown up in an airplane. Terrorism, low-level conflict, based or resulting from desperation or injustice in many parts of the world is also not going to go away, and although that is not a threat to survival in the same way that nuclear weapons are, I would have thought it is a trend which is almost bound to continue if not to get worse, and to which we have to give attention if we are going to contribute to better understanding and to avoid greater fear.

MANFRED MUELLER

I want to comment on two points. The first is the question Mr. Pearson has raised of accidental war. We all fear accidental war, and I agree that we need confidence-building measures. On the other hand, if the arms race goes on, especially the qualitative arms race, we will continue to have these fears, and they will grow, and so will the risk of accidental war. So I think it is not really enough to hope for confidence-building measures; we must also work for disarmament measures, to stop the whole race in order to reduce the fear of accidental war.

The second point is the one relating to security mechanisms. I am not against creating new machinery if there is a need for it. On the other hand, I think it is an illusion to think that we can use new machinery to solve problems we were unable to solve with existing machinery. The existing machinery should be used, and I think we have good machinery. I would refer again to the UN; I think even in the Charter there remain so many still unused possibilities. For example, the Charter calls for the Security Council to discuss problems of arms limitation, but the Council has never even begun to do so. I think we should rethink this problem too, since the Council might provide a mechanism by which the problems of disarmament too could be discussed in a more decision-oriented manner. Then we have the UN Disarmament Commission, and I think perhaps the time has come to rethink the role and function of the Commission also, in order to give it a fresh impetus and a clearer mandate.

What this leads us to is the fact that we should, in planning the future, begin first of all with existing machinery, and we should also discuss, in our own countries, what can be done to use this machinery, and especially the UN, to solve the problems of the next decade.

VLADIMIR PETROVSKY

It seems to me that one of the most important aspects of the interesting discussion we have had here is that a kind of consensus has emerged -- one which provides a framework for further dialogue looking toward the year 2000. This framework is the concept of common security, a concept which allows us to place in the right perspective the concepts of arms limitation and disarmament, and to deal simultaneously with other acute questions such as the settlement of international crises, the problem of terrorism, and others. I think that the discussion of the problem of common security should serve as a point of departure and a sort of guideline for the dialogue we are now developing.

Another important element arising out of our discussion, it seems to me, is that there is a growing understanding that the political approach is the key to security. Of course, we cannot put aside military considerations. Nevertheless, if the proper actions are taken -- and I do not think this is utopian -- strategic stability can be maintained by the year 2000 with the exclusion from the balance of forces of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

One more observation I would like to make, which is very important from the structural point of view, is that the question of common security is not a matter of East-West dialogue. It is the common concern of all, and I think that the studies carried out by scientists on the subject of nuclear winter are a good reminder that in this matter no one can take the position of an outside observer.

Because common security is a common concern, international co-operation is of particular importance. I share the opinion of those who think we should use to the utmost the opportunities offered by the United Nations.

I also share the opinion of those who believe that bilateral co-operation is of special importance. I would like to remind you that, as far as a code of behaviour for the United States and the Soviet Union is concerned, it already exists. In 1974 the highest leaders of the two countries adopted a document fundamental to the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is only one small question: how to live up to these obligations. And here I think we should press on all sides for the observance of these principles.

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